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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on Land Property Rights, Water Trade, and Regional Development
by
Muyang Ge, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2019
Major Professor: Eric C. Edwards, Ph.D. and Ryan Bosworth, Ph.D.
Department: Applied Economics
This dissertation explores how property rights to a natural resource affect economic
decisions for investment or sale, and how these decisions may, in turn, impact other ar-
eas of the economy. The first essay focuses on how incomplete land ownership on Indian
Reservations in the United States affects landowner incentives to engage in agricultural
production. Utilizing a regression discontinuity design, we find that incomplete land owner-
ship, where tribal lands are held in trust by the US government, creates significant barriers
to the acquisition of capital for agricultural investment, including investment in efficient
irrigation systems. As a result, we show less high-value agriculture occurs on these lands.
The second essay explores how the transfer of water in arid regions via water right sales
affects local labor markets and environmental outcomes. We develop a general-equilibrium
representation of a hydrologic-ecological-economic system to understand the labor market
and environmental effects of water trade. To explore the problem empirically, we examine
the water transfer from the Imperial Irrigation District to the City of San Diego. Using a
synthetic counterfactual approach, we find a decline in the number of low- and high-skill
jobs in Imperial County corresponding to the water transfer, as well as a decrease in overall
crop production, as predicted by the theoretical model. The loss of jobs and environmental
iv
benefits as a result of transfers suggests why local communities often oppose water trans-
fers. In the third essay, we seek to understand how shale-gas drilling has affected organic
food production. Using an instrumental variable estimate of a survival function, as well as
a joint model with time-dependent covariates, we obtain causal estimates of the effect of
shale development externalities on organic farming certification in Colorado. Organic farms
near gas wells see a small but significant increase in the probability of reducing organic
production. The results suggest that real or perceived contamination concerns from gas
wells impact the producer choice to engage in organic production.
(184 pages)
vPUBLIC ABSTRACT
Three Essays on Land Property Rights, Water Trade, and Regional Development
Muyang Ge
This dissertation explores how property rights to a natural resource affect economic de-
cisions for investment or sale, and how these decisions may in turn impact other areas of the
economy. The first essay focuses on how incomplete land ownership on Indian Reservations
in the United States affects landowner incentives to engage in agricultural production. The
second essay explores how the transfer of water in arid regions via water right sales affects
local labor markets and environmental outcomes. The third essay seeks to understand how
shale-gas drilling has affected organic food production. This dissertation provides several
policy implications. First, the findings suggest that the key to improving lagging agricul-
tural development on American Indian land is to improve tribal farmers’ access to capital,
so they can invest in agricultural systems (including irrigation) at the level of their neigh-
bors enjoying fee-simple title. Second, while a potentially effective solution to reduce costly
water shortfalls among high-value urban users, water sales from agricultural to urban users
appear to simultaneously decrease employment and environmental quality in the water ex-
porting region. Third, Drilling activities appear to discourage organic farming in Colorado.
While farmers with mineral ownership benefit, identifying the direct causes of lost organic
certification can inform policy that regulates negative externalities on organic farms caused
by drilling.
vi
This dissertation is dedicated to my Dad and in loving memory of my Mom with my
deepest love for always loving and supporting me.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Natural resources such as land, water, oil, and gas are often characterized by incom-
plete ownership and subject to common-pool losses. For instance, land held in common
may affect incentives for investment; water in a common-pool might be over-extracted;
and oil and gas extraction may result in environmental externalities. The focus of this
dissertation is to charactize these three examples of incomplete property rights in natural
resource extraction, and then estimate the economic effect of the current property right in-
stitution. The dissertation is organized into three essays. Each essay first characterizes the
institutional setup that creates incomplete ownership and links this context to observable
economic outcomes. Then, each essay establishes a credible set of counterfactual outcomes
for comparison. Each essay makes its contribution to the literature by using econometric
techniques novel to the application at hand.
Recent studies have discussed the underlying causes for limited Native American eco-
nomic development by studying the relationship between insecure property rights and
poverty on American Indian land (Anderson and Lueck 1992; Cornell and Kalt 2000; An-
derson and Parker 2008). The first essay extends the literature to an analysis of agricultural
irrigation. This essay uses the case of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation in eastern
Utah to explore how tribal trust land ownership affects agricultural development on reser-
vation land. A spatial Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach is used in the empirical
analysis to identify the causal effect of weak tribal institutions on agricultural investment.
The empirical framework of this paper can be divided into two sections. In the first section,
the sharp RD approach with the 1905 historical allotment boundary is applied to explore
whether the insecure tribal trust land ownership will affect the agricultural development in-
side the historical allotment boundary. In the second section, the 2017 tribal landownership
is used to apply the fuzzy RD approach. The spatial RD approach has been widely applied
2to many institutional settings but to our knowledge it has not been used to examine trust
land ownership. Moreover, this paper adds to current RD literature by examining both
sharp and fuzzy RD together. We develop a new dataset by linking agricultural irrigation
choice, land ownership and historical land allocation. The data construction procedure in
this paper provides an alternative solution to micro-level dataset construction for research
topics with difficulties in obtaining micro-level dataset.
Another essential resource, water, plays an important role in agricultural production.
The second essay examines the economic and environmental impact of a water transfer
agreement, the Quantification Settlement Agreement, in California, which began in 2004.
Water stress in the arid region is increasing due to increasing urban water demand. Water
reallocation between different regions and sectors has become one of the solutions to address
the need to meet urban water demand. Few studies have explored the effect of cross-sectoral
water transfer in different regions, but effects are varied (Brooks and Harris 2008; Cai 2008;
Juana, Strzepek, and Kirsten 2011; Wimmer et al. 2015). This study extends current
literature to a case study of the United States’ largest ever ag-to-urban water transfer.
A water transfer between agricultural and urban areas benefits the parties who are
directly involved, but the impact on other parties is hotly debated (Howe, Lazo, and Weber
1990; Holcombe and Sobel 2001; Hadjigeorgalis and Lillywhite 2004; Mann and Wu¨stemann
2008; Grafton et al. 2011). We develop a general equilibrium representation of a hydrologic-
ecological-economic system to explore the theoretical effect of trading water on agricultural
production and employment in the water exporting region. In our empirical framework, we
apply the synthetic control methodology to test the predictions of our theoretical model.
This is the first study that links general equilibrium with empirical results in examining
the efficiency of a regional water agreement between agricultural and urban sector. Our
theoretical and empirical analyses together suggest that a decline in water availability may
cause both reductions in employment and environmental damage. However, the increased
value of water will be captured by parties directly involved in the transfer. In this paper,
we look at the increased return in terms of direct payment from water trading in the water
3exporting region.
In addition to agricultural inputs, such as land and water, environmental externalities
may affect agricultural production. The rising concern about hydraulic fracturing has been
documented recently (Allred et al. 2015; Vidic et al. 2013; McKenzie et al. 2012; Rakitan
2018; Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Timmins 2015), but surprisingly few studies have focused
on the effect of shale development on agriculture (Weber, Brown, and Pender 2013; Hitaj,
Boslett, and Weber 2017; Farah 2017). The third essay adds to current literature by
studying the environmental externality caused by oil and gas extraction in the state of
Colorado.
We created a novel geospatial dataset with organic farm locations and certification
length in the United States. By plotting the organic farm and fracking well locations, Col-
orado is selected as the target state to explore whether hydraulic fracturing affects main-
taining organic certification. Two empirical models were used in this essay: Instrumental
Variable Estimation in a Survival Analysis and a Joint Model with an endogenous time-
dependent variable. An Instrumental Variable Estimation in a Survival Analysis context is
used to solve the endogeneity problem caused by a lack of correspondence between oil and
gas deposits and suitable agricultural land. Then, the exposure to fracking wells is treated
as a time-dependent variable using the Joint Model to more accurately explore the impact
of fracking on maintaining organic certification. To our knowledge, this study is the first
study using survival analysis methodology to explore the impact of hydraulic fracturing on
organic farming.
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 display three essays
as discussed in the introduction. Each essay has a separate introduction and conclusion.
Chapter 5 summarizes the dissertation and discusses the possible policy implications of the
research contained in the dissertation. References for each essay are collected together and
provided after Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 2
LAND OWNERSHIP AND IRRIGATION ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS
2.1 Abstract
American Indian reservations are often characterized by low income and high rates
of poverty relative to adjacent non-reservation land. To understand the role institutions
governing land ownership play in these outcomes, we examine agricultural land use and
irrigation on parcels on and adjacent to the Uintah-Ouray Indian Reservation in eastern
Utah. Land within the reservation is held in trust by the federal government and has
significant restrictions on its use and development. We predict that this land will see lower
investment in irrigation and therefore lower agricultural productivity. We use the exogenous
allocation boundaries of a 1905 land allotment as a natural experiment, employing both a
sharp and a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design to explore how land ownership
has affected agricultural land use, irrigation levels, and irrigation investment. Our results
suggest that the original allocations provided land of similar quality across the border.
Despite this, tribal lands are around 18 percentage points less likely to be irrigated today,
and conditional on being irrigated, tribal land has a 31 percentage point lower rate of
capital-intensive sprinkler irrigation. Tribal land is also less likely to grow high-value crops.
These results suggest that trust ownership creates significant barriers to the acquisition of
capital for agricultural investment, and helps explain lagging agricultural development on
reservations.
2.2 Introduction
The link between insecure property rights and poverty on American Indian reservations
has drawn significant attention in recent years. The median household income for Ameri-
can Indian communities in 2016 was $38,502 while the estimate of the U.S. as a whole was
5$55,322.1 This divergence is even more pronounced in terms of agricultural production.
In 2007, the average American Indian farm saw sales of $40,331, less than 1/3 of the US
average.2 Previous studies have traced the underlying causes for limited tribal development
to weak institutions as a result of both tribal and federal policies (Anderson and Lueck
1992; Cornell and Kalt 2000; Anderson and Parker 2008). We extend this literature to an
analysis of agricultural irrigation. With 75% of land in Indian country dedicated to agricul-
ture, understanding how institutions affect the productivity is key to improving economic
development on reservations (Shoemaker 2006, p.11).
In this paper, we use the case of the Uintah and Ouray (Uintah) Reservation in eastern
Utah to explore how institutions have affected the pattern of agricultural development.
The Uintah Reservation is the second largest by area in the United States and, like many
reservations, its current area has been reduced significantly over time. Important to this
paper, the tribe was ultimately allotted a few contiguous blocks of land in 1905 via the
Dawes Act, with the remaining portions of the reservation opened to white settlement.
Within this allocation, some land was claimed as fee-simple by tribal members while the
unclaimed land reverted to tribal control as federal trust land in 1937. Fee-simple owners
have complete property rights and can freely sell or lease the land. In contrast, tribal land
sales are restricted and require the review of both the tribal government and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA). Throughout the paper we define tribal land as any land or interest in
land owned by a tribe or tribes, title to which is held in trust by the United States or is
subject to a restriction against alienation under the laws of the United States.3 The lack of
land use flexibility and the inability of lenders to enforce contracts on reservations results
in a lack of access to commercial credit, limiting the opportunities to borrow money for
capital-intensive improvements (Anderson and Lueck 1992).
In this study, we apply a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) approach to identify the
effect of tribal ownership on agricultural development. Specifically, we utilize the straight-
line boundary of the 1905 allocation, both directly and as an instrument on current land
1U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
2Data is from Census of Agriculture 2012
3Definition is from Tribal Energy Resource Agreement (TERAs).
6ownership, to identify the effect of trust ownership on irrigation and irrigation investment.
Land ownership changed discretely at the straight-line boundary in 1905 at the time of
allocation. On one side, all the lands were under tribal trust, while on the other side, all
the lands were fee-simple. The spatial RD approach has been widely applied to a variety
of institutional settings (see, for instance, Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 2007; Dell 2010;
Grout, Jaeger, and Plantinga 2011; Dachis, Duranton, and Turner 2011; Dell 2015; Card
and Giuliano 2016; Pan, Smith, and Sulaiman 2018), but to our knowledge has not been
used to examine trust land ownership.
We develop a new dataset by linking agricultural irrigation choice, land ownership data,
and historic land allocation. We implement a sharp RD approach with local polynomial
regression to examine the impacts of current agricultural choices across the 1905 allotment
boundary. However, since 1905 some land has changed hands, so the assignment of the
treatment today may be based on additional variables that are unobserved. Selection into
treatment is dependent on both observable and unobservable factors, and we therefore ex-
pect the boundary of 2017 land ownership to be a “fuzzy” rather than “sharp” discontinuity.
To address this issue we utilize a sharp RD design on the 1905 boundary excluding all lands
which have switched ownership, and then implement a fuzzy RD design. This approach
treats the 1905 boundary as an instrument for current land ownership and rescales the
observed effect of the discontinuity based on the probability of receiving treatment using a
nonparametric local linear (polynomial) estimator.
We find that tribal lands have irrigation rates around eighteen percentage points lower
under the instrumented 2017 tribal land ownership. Further, tribal lands see significantly
less investment in capital-intensive irrigation systems, with irrigated tribal land seeing 31
percentage point lower rates of sprinkler irrigation. Tribal land is also less likely to grow
high-value crops. On the lands that did not change hands, the sharp RD results show that
tribal lands have 13 percentage points less investment in sprinkler irrigation systems, and
are less likely to grow high-value crops. These results suggest that tribal trust ownership
inhibits agricultural production and irrigation investment on the reservation. While there
7is anecdotal evidence the difficulties are related to insecure land tenure, we also discuss
several alterative explanations for the underinvestment in tribal agriculture.
The paper proceeds as follows: section two provides background on tribal land alloca-
tion and the Uintah Reservation. Section three describes an economic framework for the
effect of insecure land tenure and provides predictions. Section four provides details on the
empirical design and econometric approach. The econometric results are provided in section
five and section six concludes.
2.3 Background
2.3.1 Reservation Land Ownership
American Indian Reservations were formed from territory controlled by the United
States government to provide an area of settlement for previously autonomous tribes. Ini-
tially, reservation allocations were to tribes, but as land pressure increased, the US Congress
in 1887 passed the Dawes Act which allowed the government to allocate land within the
reservations to individuals. Reservation areas had portions reserved for allocation to tribal
members and the remaining land was opened for white settlement. In the allocated areas,
individual tribal members could make a claim to own land individually. The 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act again changed the rules and the unclaimed allotment areas reverted
to tribal control. The Act resulted in the three categories of land ownership we see on
reservations today: fee-simple, land which is privately owned; tribal trust, land allocated to
tribes under the Dawes Act but which was never claimed by tribal members and reverted to
tribal control; and individual trust, which is allocated land that was claimed by individuals
but for which the process of transitioning to fee-simple was never completed.
Trust land has significantly different constraints on land trade and alienation, relative
to fee-simple. While the owner of the private land can freely sell or lease the land, tribal
trust land is owned by the federal government and managed jointly by tribal governmental
organizations and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). BIA maintains ownership records and
manages almost any transaction involving trust land. Trust property cannot be transferred,
8alienated, or leased without the approval of the BIA. These approvals typically require
long appraisal and documentation processes. In 2003, the Indian Land Tenure Foundation
(ILTF) conducted a community survey to measure the view of Indian peoples on land
ownership and managemraent. It found perceptions of systematic barriers in the use of
property rights related to land and natural resources, especially the slowness of BIA actions.
Specifically, that the federal bureaucracy is unable to provide legal certainty or act quickly
and is insensitive to traditional ways and knowledge.4 Anderson and Lueck (1992) found
that trust land constraints imposed by the federal government significantly reduced the
value of agricultural output on reservation land.
Individual or tribal trust land may be mortgaged with the consent of the landowners
and the BIA. However, many private commercial lending difficulties exist on trust lands.
First, individuals seldom own direct title and therefore do not have collateral. Second, it
is nearly impossible to get title insurance on Indian trust land because only a few title
insurance companies are qualified to offer it. Loans secured by trust land still require BIA
approval, and there is no uniform approval process for different BIA offices.5
2.3.2 Indian Agriculture
The potential for jurisdictional uncertainty creates complexity and reduces access to
credit for Indian farmers and ranchers. Even though the tribe functions as a sovereign
entity according to the governing by-laws, the U.S. Secretary of Interior has final authority
over many tribal actions. Agricultural land leases are an example. Agricultural leases may
be negotiated directly with the landowner, often the tribal government, but they are still
subject to BIA approval. Tribal leases are subject to the National Environmental Policy Act,
which applies to federal agencies but not private fee-simple sales or leases (Shoemaker 2006,
p.13). Leases are codified as having a maximum duration of 10 years, unless substantial
4Indian Land Tenure Foundation (ILTF). 2003. “Community Survey: Importance of Land and Value
of Property Rights.” URL:https://iltf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/community survey 2003.pdf
5Information is summarized from U.S. Department of Treasury. 2006. Guide to Mortgage Lending in
Indian Country.
9investment is required, in which case 25-year leases are possible.6
Indian farmers have faced difficulties and discrimination in accessing USDA loans.
Evidence suggests that the USDA systematically discriminated against Indian farmers by
denying them credit they routinely offered to white farmers under the USDA Farm Loan
Program. A class-action lawsuit encompassing the period 1981-1999 (Keepseagle v. Vilsack)
was settled in 2010 with a $760 million payment to affected Indian farmers. USDA has
traditionally been the largest single lender to Indian farmers and ranchers (Shoemaker 2006,
p.22). Discrimination in access to credit is one potential explanation for lagging agricultural
development. Tribes have also argued that crop insurance products offered by USDA are
not well-suited for the agricultural practices of tribal farmers and that tribal farms may not
qualify for federal disaster assistance.7
Another potential limit to the development of irrigated agriculture on tribal land is
problematic access to federal irrigation projects. Reservations are primarily located in arid
regions, and the BIA operates 16 irrigation projects. In 2006, the General Accounting Office
criticized the operation of these projects due to deferred maintenance, a lack of managerial
expertise in water systems, and uncertainty over financial sustainability. Because irrigation
management is not a priority for BIA, the report concludes that it might be beneficial if
an agency like the Bureau of Reclamation, which provides water for non-tribal farmers,
managed these projects(GAO 2006, p.28).
2.3.3 Uintah and Ouray Reservation
The Uintah reservation was established for the native people of eastern Utah as a
combined reservation in 1886 (Cuch 2000, p.196). The passage of the Dawes Act in 1887
started the process by which significant portions of the reservation were reallocated to
private individuals. Six years later Congress passed another Indian Appropriations Act and
set a timeline for the BIA to acquire an agreement with the tribe on their land allotment.
6This information is summarized from 25 U.S. Code § 3715 - Leasing of Indian agricultural lands. URL:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/25/3715
7https://www.tribalselfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Farm-Bill.pdf;http://www.ncai
.org/NFBC Policy Recommendations.pdf
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The reservation was allotted in 1905 and entry by settlers onto the unreserved and unallotted
lands occurred after that time. Under the allotment policy, adult members of the Uintah
tribe received allotment lands between 40 and 640 acres, depending on the suitability of
the land for farming. This property was subject to a protected status that forbade it being
sold by the individual for twenty-five years, at the end of which time the owner would be
recognized as an American citizen (McPherson 2000, p.22).
In 1906 the federal government authorized construction of the Uintah Indian Irrigation
Project, which provided water to both Indian and non-Indian farmers in the area. Within
fifteen years of the allotment, tribal members had sold or leased 30,000 acres of Uintah
land, much of which was then irrigated by non-Indian farmers (Cuch 2000, p.207). In 1937,
under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, all tribal lands that had not been privatized
reverted to Uintah control. Today, this land is held in tribal trust and the U.S. Secretary
of the Interior must approve many Uintah tribal actions, which hinders the tribe’s ability
to create economic growth (Cuch 2000, p.222). “Even though the Ute Tribe is one of
the major economic contributors to Uinta Basin and the state, the tribe experiences the
lingering problems associated with having been proclaimed sovereign yet not being treated
as such by county, state, and federal entities. This creates disputes between the tribe and
these bodies of government over issues such as jurisdiction, double taxation, rights-of-way,
and water rights (Cuch 2000, p.221).”
Today, the Uintah reservation is the second-largest US Indian reservation in land area.
Figure 2.1 shows the allocation of land within the reservation. Federal lands located around
the northern and western boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian reservation are pri-
marily national forest in the Uintah Mountains. In the agricultural areas, tribal trust and
private fee-simple land are the primary ownership types. Uintah tribal bylaws limit land
leases to a period of five years, although exceptions may be made for irrigable land.8
The area around the Uintah Reservation is arid, with the agricultural areas receiving
approximately 270mm of precipitation per year. There are thirty-two different crops grown
8Constitution and By-Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation Article
VI(1)(c).
11
in the area, but the majority of acreage is in alfalfa. The average irrigation rate within two
miles of the tribal boundary is around 39.7% on fee-simple land versus 22.8% on tribal land.
Within the two-mile window, only 7.3% of irrigated tribal land uses sprinkler irrigation,
compared to 31.2% of private irrigated land. We now turn to an analytic framework to
demonstrate how insecure property right institutions could cause tribal lands to differ in
their investment in irrigation.
2.4 Economic Framework and Predictions
Previous research on property rights and investment (Demsetz 1974; Besley 1995; An-
derson and Parker 2008) suggests there are multiple channels through which land property
rights affect agricultural investment. We adapt Besley’s model to our case.
Consider a farmer who invests c amount of capital in his/her farm. The revenue
function of investment can be written as R(c, x) where x represents land property rights
now and in the future; x increases as the land property rights become stronger. R(·) is
assumed to be an increasing function of c and x, and concave in c. C(c, x) represents the
cost of investment and it is an increasing function of c and non-increasing function of x.
The optimal investment choice is then given by:
(2.1) max
c
I(c, x) = R(c, x)− C(c, x)
The first order condition for the choice of capital investment, c, is:
(2.2) I1(c, x) = 0
Taking the total derivative of the first order condition in equation 2.2, we get:
(2.3)
∂c
∂x
= −I12(c, x)
I11(c, x)
Because of the concavity of the investment function, I(·), the maximum point exists
if I11 < 0. Importantly, if I12 > 0, it implies a positive relationship between agricultural
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investment and land property rights. We will discuss how land property rights could affect
agricultural investment through three different channels.
The first channel is freedom from expropriation (Demsetz 1974; Alchian and Demsetz
1973). That is, a farmer does not have incentive to invest in his/her land if it could easily
be seized by others. Suppose the probability of losing farmland in the future is p(x), where
p(x) is between zero and one, and decreases as property rights increase. The direct return
from farming is defined as Rp(c). Then, the maximization of the expected return for the
farmer is:
(2.4) max
c
R(c, x) = (1− p(x))×Rp(c) + p(x)× 0
R12(c, x) can be calculated by taking the derivative of R1(c, x) with respect to x:
R1(c, x) = R
′
p(c)− p(x)×R
′
p(c)(2.5)
R12(c, x) = −p′(x)×R′p(c) > 0(2.6)
Since I12(c, x) = R12(c, x) − C12(c, x) and C(c, x) is a non-increasing function of x by
assumption, it is straightforward to conclude that I12(c, x) > 0.
The second channel is using land as collateral: secure land property rights reduce the
interest rate. Lower interest rates increase land investment because the interest rate is equal
to the required marginal productivity of capital investment (Feder and Feeny 1991; Besley
1995). Suppose a farmer would like to borrow money from a lender to invest in a sprinkler
system. We assume the initial wealth of the farmer is 0. The money borrowed from the
lender is defined as b. The lender charges an interest rate of r(x). We assume that interest
rate is negatively correlated with the land property rights, ∂r(x)∂x . The probability of earning
the return is q. The physical return from the new sprinkler system is Rp(c), R
′
p(·) > 0 and
R
′′
p(·) < 0. The utility function u(·) is a smooth, concave and increasing function. Thus,
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the farmer’s expected utility function can be written as:
(2.7) I(c, x) = max
b,c
u(b− c) + qu(Rp(c)− r(x)× b) + (1− q)× 0
The first order condition with respect to the choice variables b, c can be specified as:
−u′(b− c) + qu′(Rp(c)− r(x)× b)×R′p(c) = 0(2.8)
u
′
(b− c) + qu′(Rp(c)− r(x)× b)×−r(x) = 0(2.9)
It is straightforward to show that:
(2.10) R
′
p(c) = r(x)
The first order condition for the choice of c, after the envelope theorem is used for the
choice of b, can be written as:
(2.11) I1(c, x) = R
′
p(c)− r(x)
Solving equation 2.10 and 2.11 simultaneously, we obtain:
(2.12) I12(c, x) = −∂r(x)
∂x
Equation 2.10 implies that at the maximum utility, the marginal productivity of capital
invested on an Indian farmland is equal to the interest rate charged from a lender. Since
we assume a negative relationship between land property rights and interest rate, ∂r(x)∂x , we
can conclude that I12(c, x) > 0.
The third channel comes from the intuition that better transfer rights reduce the land
transfer cost and increase investment incentives. We assume that the trading cost is depen-
dent on a farmer’s transfer rights. Suppose the sale price of the land is p. If the farmer sells
the land, the best offer available is w, which has the density function of g(w), w ∈ [w,w].
If the Indian farmer decides to use the land, his/her payoff is δc, where c is his/her return
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to investment and δ is the marginal product of capital, which has the density function of
f(δ), δ ∈ [δ, δ]. The trading cost, defined as pi(x)c, is a decreasing function of x, and pi′(x)
is less than zero. Then, the optimal land price under a Nash bargaining solution is:
(2.13) max
p
(p− pic− δc)(wc− p)
Solving equation 2.13, we get the optimal land price, p∗ = pi+δ+w2 c. Hence, the farmer’s
payoff from selling his/her farmland is p∗ − pic = δ+w−pi2 c, and that from not selling the
farmland is δc. Consequently, the farmer’s expected return is:
(2.14) R(c, x) = cE(max
δ + w − pi
2
, δ)
Differentiating equation 2.14 with respect to c, we obtain:
R1(c, x) = E(max
δ + w − pi
2
, δ)(2.15)
=
∫ w
w
[
∫ w−pi(x)
δ
δ + w − pi(x)
2
f(δ)dδ +
∫ δ
w−pi(x)
δf(δ)dδ]g(w)dw
Further differentiating equation 2.16 with respect to x yields:
(2.16) R12(c, x) = −[
∫ w
w
F (w − pi(x))g(w)dw]pi′(x)
Because land property rights are negatively correlated with land transfer cost, that is
pi
′
(x) > 0, we get R12(c, x) > 0 and I12(c, x) > 0.
Uncertainty from expropriation, insufficient collateral, and high land transfer costs con-
tribute to insecure land property rights which, in turn, suppress agricultural investment. In
the subsequent empirical analysis, we focus on whether this prediction holds for investment
in irrigation capital. Capital is required to construct irrigation works, purchase pumps,
pipes, and other equipment, as well as to prepare a field to receive water. Both flood and
sprinkler irrigation requires capital expenditure, although the investment cost of flood irri-
gation is significantly lower than sprinkler systems, such as center pivot systems (Dumler,
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Rogers, and O’Brien 2007). Importantly, a more-efficient sprinkler system increases yields
and allows for more acres to be irrigated (Dumler, Rogers, and O’Brien 2007). Irrigation,
and particularly sprinkler irrigation, increases a farmer’s ability to grow high-value crops.
Therefore, on two otherwise identical parcels, we expect: (1) less investment in irrigation
technology on tribal land; (2) conditional on irrigation, we expect less investment in sprin-
kler irrigation on tribal land; and (3) we expect lower value crops to be grown on tribal
land. The next section lays out our empirical methodology for testing these predictions.
2.5 Empirical Framework
2.5.1 Data Construction
Variables on land use, land ownership, land quality and climate are constructed for the
Uintah-Ouray Indian Reservation. Table 2.1 shows summary statistics and data construc-
tion formulae. Our unit of observation is the parcel from cadastral survey records housed
by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and supplemented with local records and geo-
graphic control coordinates obtained from states, counties, and the United States Geological
Survey (USGS) and the United States Forest Service (USFS). Parcels are generally around
40 acres. The survey typically divides land into 6-mile-square townships and townships
are subdivided into 36 one-mile-square sections. Sections can be further subdivided into
quarter sections, quarter-quarter sections, or irregular government lots.9 We include the
township as a control variable to make sure that we only compare the adjacent parcels.
Land ownership type is assigned to each parcel using Geographic Information System (GIS)
measurement. The land ownership data comes from the State Geographic Information
Database (SGID). This data set contains current surface land ownership administration
and designation categories as of 2017. The 2017 tribal land boundary is extracted from this
data set. The 1905 allotment boundary is digitized from the Uintah Indian Reservation
Disposition map created in 1905. This disposition map contains historical land allotment
details at the parcel level for the Uintah reservation. Distance to the boundary is calculated
9https://nationalmap.gov/small scale/a plss.html
16
as the shortest distance from the border of each parcel to the 1905 and 2017 boundaries
using GIS. We then link the public land survey system (PLSS) quarter, quarter section
(parcel) land ownership in 1905 and 2017 to a soil productivity index (PI) grid.
Soil Productivity Data
We obtain the soil PI grid raster map from Iowa State University Geospatial Laboratory
for Soil Information. The PI is an ordinal measure of soil productivity, which ranges from 0
(least productive) to 19 (most productive), based on soil taxonomy information (Schaetzl,
Krist Jr, and Miller 2012). Since the index is ordinal and some parcels contain two different
soil productivity indices, we cannot calculate the mean soil productivity of each parcel as a
continuous variable. Following Schaetzl, Krist Jr, and Miller (2012), we assign different soil
productivity ranks to each PLSS parcel to ensure each parcel has a unique soil productivity
rank. If one parcel has two different soil productivity ranks, we divide this parcel into two
parcels with unique rank.
The mean elevation of each parcel in the baseline map is calculated via GIS. The
elevation data is obtained from the NASA Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission (SRTM)
90m Digital Elevation Dataset. The SRTM provides digital elevation data (DEMs) for over
80% of the globe and the resolution of the dataset is 3 arc-seconds (approximately 90m
resolution).
Agricultural Data
We construct our parcel-level agricultural data using the agricultural land use per-
centage within each parcel. First, we calculate the agricultural rate using cropland data
from CropScape-Cropland Data Layer (CDL)10 in the year 2015. The CDL is a raster,
geo-referenced, crop-specific land cover data layer produced using satellite imagery. Classi-
fication accuracy is generally 85% to 95% for the major, crop-specific land cover categories.
The CDL database covers the entire Uintah reservation. We obtain 9,304 parcels of 40 acres
10CropScape dataset is hosted by National Agricultural Statistics Service, United State Department of
Agriculture. Agricultural land layer is in year 2015. Website:https://nassgeodata.gmu.edu/CropScape/
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from CDL cropland classification. The average agricultural rate was approximately 30% in
the Uintah region. The second database we use is the Water Related Land Use (WRL)
data set published annually by the Utah Division of Water Resources.11 This database pro-
vides more accurate agricultural and non-agricultural land cover on portions of the Uintah
reservation, but it does not cover the entire study region. The total number of observations
is 8,178 parcels, with a 60% agricultural rate. We test the agricultural rate across the
boundary using both the CDL and WRL datasets and compare the results.
Irrigation Data
Irrigation rate and sprinkler irrigation rate data come from the WRL data for the year
2012. There are two primary irrigation methods used in the region, sprinkler and flood.
Because drip-irrigated acreage is small, its effect on our empirical results is inconsequential
and is thus dropped from the analysis of irrigation. Parcel level irrigation and sprinkler
irrigation rates are captured by overlaying the irrigation map and sprinkler map on our
baseline map. We obtain the sprinkler irrigation rate by dividing the sprinkler irrigated
land by total irrigated land. The formulas to calculate the irrigation rate and sprinkler
irrigation rate can be found in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.2 shows irrigation by type in the Uintah study region. The left panel shows
the correspondence between WRL parcels and the 1905 allotment boundary, and right panel
shows the correspondence with the 2017 land ownership. The solid black line indicates the
1905 allotment boundary on the left, and the 2017 tribal land boundary on the right.
High-value Crops Rate Data
We obtain crop data used in this study from the CDL and WRL data. We divide the
crops grown in the Uintah reservation into two groups: (i) high-value crops, such as corn and
beans, and (ii) low-value crops, such as alfalfa (See Table A.1 for crop value classification).
11Final water related land use data describing agricultural related land use in the Uintah region are
between 2011 and 2016. The survey year of Uintah region is Year 2012. The last update of this dataset is
August 3, 2017.
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Table 2.1 shows that more high-value crops are grown on average on private land than tribal
land in both data sets.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the crop value distribution on tribal and private land in the
Uintah reservation using WRL data set. The left panel provides the distribution using 1905
allotment boundary, while the right panel is for the 2017 tribal land boundary. In both
panels, it appears that more low value crops are inside the tribal boundary.
Climate Data
Temperature and precipitation raster datasets were collected from WorldClim1.4: Cur-
rent condition (1960-1990). The raster dataset provides the average value of climate statis-
tics between year 1960 and 1990. The resolution of the raster datasets is 30 arc-seconds
(1km). We obtain three temperature indicators, including annual mean temperature, max-
imum temperature of the warmest month, and minimum temperature of the coldest month.
In addition, we include precipitation indicators, such as annual precipitation, to control for
differences in agricultural productivity across the reservation boundary.
2.5.2 Regression Discontinuity Design
We adopt a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) design to study the cross-border
variation in agriculture in the Uintah region. The spatial RD approach has been broadly
implemented in different contexts in recent years to study intervention or treatment effects
(Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 2007; Dell 2010; Grout, Jaeger, and Plantinga 2011; Dachis,
Duranton, and Turner 2011; Dell 2015; Card and Giuliano 2016; Pan, Smith, and Sulaiman
2018). Our first empirical strategy exploits the exogenous allocation boundary of 1905 land
allotment to explore the impacts of historical tribal land allotment on recent agricultural
activities in the context of a sharp RD design.
The sharp RD approach used in this paper hinges on two identifying assumptions. First,
the local randomization assumption requires that within a bandwidth of pre-specified size
around the 1905 allotment boundary, whether or not an observation receives the treatment
is essentially randomly determined. This assumption implies that all the relevant variables
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should vary smoothly at the 1905 allotment boundary, and observations located just outside
of the 1905 allotment boundary should be an appropriate counterfactual for those located
just inside the boundary. To assess the validity of this requirement, we examine the climate
statistics, land, and soil variables inside and outside of the 1905 allotment boundary.
Table 2.2 presents the balance test of climate, land, and soil variables for five bandwidth
choices (0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5 miles) around the 1905 allotment boundary. In particular,
the Welch t-test with log transformation and nonparametric Wilcoxon test are used to test
for the difference in means between tribal and private land. The Welch t-test statistics
are reported in parentheses, while the Wilcoxon test statistics are in brackets. In the first
three columns, the sample includes only parcels located within less than 0.5 miles from the
1905 allotment boundary, and this threshold is gradually increased to 0.75, 1, 1.25, and
1.5 miles in the succeeding columns. It is apparent that the annual mean temperature,
annual precipitation, and precipitation of driest month are statistically identical within 1
mile (0.5, 0.75, 1 mile bandwidths) distance across the boundary. As the distance from
the boundary increases (1.25 and 1.5 mile bandwidths), however, the values of the balance
test variables become statistically different across the boundary. This is consistent with
the identification of the treatment effect under RD design. The eighth row shows small
statistically significant differences in elevation. The elevation differences are due in part to
the location of the Uintah reservation, which is surrounded by a mountain range. The soil
productivity is identical within small bandwidths (0.75, 1, 1.25 mile bandwidths).
The second identifying assumption of sharp RD is a continuity assumption, which re-
quires that the only change that occurs at the 1905 allotment boundary is the shift in
treatment status. McCrary (2008) proposed an estimator designed to test the continuity
of the density function of the forcing variable. He argued that if observations are able to
sort themselves across a given bandwidth, the observations just to the left of the cut-off are
likely to be substantially different from those to the right. In contrast, De la Cuesta and
Imai (2016) argued that the local randomization assumption is stronger than the continuity
assumption, and nothing in the continuity assumption requires the expected potential out-
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comes on both sides of the threshold to be identical. That means imbalance in pretreatment
covariates just below and above the cut-off does not necessarily imply the violation of the
identification assumption for a valid RD design.
Under the spatial RD setting the selective sorting assumption would, however, be vio-
lated if a direct 1905 allotment effect triggered significant out-migration of relatively highly
irrigated land parcels, leading to a larger indirect effect. However, because American Indian
Reservations were initially enacted for the express purpose of allowing the tribal members
to utilize the land for agricultural production, the continuity assumption is unlikely to hold.
For this reason, we recognize the possibility of land switching around the discontinuity and
build our models to identify treatment effects under these conditions. Because tribal land
boundaries have changed since 1905, we first apply our sharp RD approach only on the
lands that do not change ownership to examine the impacts of current agricultural choices
across the 1905 allotment boundary. These lands are not affected by the land transactions
since 1905 and for this reason retain random assignment. Table 2.3 presents the balance
test for the 1905 tribal land boundary with the lands that do not change ownership. The
results for lands that never change hands (Table 2.3) are similar to those from Table 2.2.
Specifically, the parcels adjacent to the 1905 allotment boundary tend to be similar in rea-
sonable characteristics within smaller distance for the boundary. However, they are different
with further distances. Some of the observed differences between Table 2.2 and 2.3 can be
explained by the fact that fewer tribal parcels are selected in the dataset that never change
hands.
Our second empirical strategy utilizes a fuzzy RD design, which allows us to explore
the impact of recent tribal land ownership on agricultural investment today. In the fuzzy
RD design, instead of using the lands that do not change ownership, we use all the parcels
located within the designated bandwidth of the 2017 boundary. The right panel of Figure
2.1 illustrates the land ownership changes between 1905 and 2017. Green areas represent
the land held by the tribe in both 1905 and 2017; red areas represent the land that was
allocated to the tribe and became fee-simple between 1905 and 2017; grey areas represent
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the land not allotted to the tribe and opened for settlement in 1905; and blue areas represent
land that was not originally allocated and was transferred back to the tribe after 1905. It
is evident that most of the land returned to the tribe is located on the periphery of tribal
land, while most of the land sold to private owners is intermingled with the tribal land.
This checkerboard pattern of tribal and private land causes considerable fragmentation of
the tribal boundary today.
Table 2.4 presents the balance test across the 2017 tribal land boundary. It is clear that
all the climate and land variables are statistically different across the 2017 boundary. This
is the result of tribal landowners selling land to non-tribal members (recall that more than
30,000 acres of Uintah agricultural land were sold or leased to non-Indian neighbors (Cuch
2000, p.207)), which considerably altered the original 1905 allotment boundary. Climate
and land quality have likely affected whether a parcel has changed ownership since 1905.
Consequently, these transactions cause fuzziness in our sample along the 2017 boundary,
and we address this by applying a fuzzy RD design, using 1905 allotment boundary as an
instrument for current land ownership.
Empirical framework for the 1905 allotment boundary
The 1905 allotment boundary treatment is a straight-line discontinuous function. Thus,
we implement a sharp RD design to examine the impact of tribal trust ownership on the
agricultural rate, irrigation rate, sprinkler-irrigation rate, and high-value crops rate across
the 1905 allotment boundary. For simplicity, we name the treatment in the sharp RD
model Allotment1905, which is an indicator, equal to 1 if parcel i is within x miles inside
of boundary and equal to 0 if parcel i is within x miles outside of boundary. dist1905i
is the running variable, representing shortest distance of parcel i from the 1905 allotment
boundary (dist1905). dist1905 is the threshold value (boundary position), equal to 0 in
this model. Since the assignment to treatment is sharply determined by the 1905 allotment
boundary, the relationship between the treatment indicator and the running variable dist
is established by
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Allotment1905i =
 1 if dist1905i ≥ dist19050 if dist1905i < dist1905
The parametric linear RD model with a control for distance from the cutoff is:
R1905i = α+ β1Allotment1905i + β2f(dist1905i − dist1905)(2.17)
+β3f(dist1905i − dist1905)×Allotment1905i +X ′ϕ+ i
where R1905i is the outcome variable of interest of parcel i within x-miles distance from
either side of the boundary. X is a vector of controls that includes soil productivity, township
and elevation. In our model, we test four different outcome variables: agricultural rate,
irrigation rate, sprinkler-irrigation rate, and high-value crop rate. f(·) is a polynomial
distance function and i is an error term with standard properties. The parameter of
interest is β1, which captures the treatment effect.
As long as a parcel is near the cutoff, dist1905, the treatment effect of Allotment1905 is
valid. Hence, an estimate of average treatment effect can be obtained by comparing average
R1905i of those just above and those just below dist1905. However, the bandwidth has to
be large enough to encompass sufficient observations to get a reasonable amount of precision
in the estimated average value of R1905i. A larger bandwidth yields more precision but
potentially introduces bias.
Empirical framework for the 2017 tribal land ownership
To understand the difference in irrigation rates across the current land ownership
boundary, we utilize a fuzzy regression discontinuity. The relationship between land own-
ership today (Uintah2017i) and the running variable dist2017i is established by:
Uintah2017i =
 1 if dist2017i ≥ dist2017 = 00 if dist2017i < dist2017 = 0
We cannot compare the average treatment effect immediately above and below the
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2017 boundary because the average treatment effect around the cut-off will understate the
causal effect. Instead, we can adopt Allotment1905 from the sharp RD specification above
as an instrumental variable.
There are two basic assumptions about the instrumental variable. First, the rele-
vance condition: Allotment1905i should have the potential to affect the probability that
Uintah2017i = 1. From Figure 2.2, it is clear that the 2017 tribal boundary is strongly re-
lated to the 1905 allotment boundary. Second, the exclusion condition: Allotment1905i has
to be unrelated to R2017i, conditional on Uintah2017i and other controls such as climate
and land quality. While not directly testable, we believe this is a plausible assumption for
several reasons. First, the 1905 allotment utilized several straight-line boundaries, which
were unlikely to have been selected in a way that is correlated with future irrigation scheme.
Second, the allotment borders were assigned before the irrigation infrastructure was built
on the Uintah reservation.
Because the irrigation project delivered water to both tribal and non-tribal lands, it
is also not the case that these boundaries were subsequently used to determine irrigation
access. Moreover, the balance tests across the 1905 allotment boundary do not indicate
substantial differences in land and climate characteristics that might have been observable
at the time of assignment (see Table 2.2).
The fuzzy RD design is a two-stage estimation process. The first stage involves re-
gressing the 2017 treatment indicator on the 1905 boundary and additional controls (soil
productivity, township and elevation):
(2.18) Uintah2017i = λ+ γAllotment1905i + g(dist1905i − dist1905) +X ′ϕ+ νi
To estimate the first stage we fit a generalized linear model with a probit function. Once
we obtain the fitted value of Uintah2017i from stage 1, we use ̂Uintah2017l to evaluate the
average treatment effect in stage 2:
(2.19) R2017i = δ + β1 ̂Uintah2017l + h(dist1905i − dist1905) +X ′ϕ+ i
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The treatment effect is captured by β1.
Bandwidth and functional form selection
Identification of the local spatial RD treatment effect requires data points in the im-
mediate neighborhood around the border, whether it is a sharp or fuzzy design. As the
neighborhood expands, the estimate of the average treatment effect becomes less noisy,
while the risk of bias of the estimate increases as the trends and variations in other vari-
ables across the discontinuity may affect the estimates. While some of these effects can be
controlled using additional regressors and polynomial order trends in distance, the selec-
tion of the bandwidth around the discontinuity remains an important consideration. In the
present study, we use a bandwidth selection procedure based on Calonico, Cattaneo, and
Titiunik (2014, 2015), who suggest using a simple kernel and then verifying the robustness
of the results to different choices of bandwidth. Accordingly, we analyze the data with
0.5-mile, 0.78-mile,1-mile, 1.25-mile and 1.5-mile bandwidths around the 1905 allotment
boundary, using both sharp and fuzzy RD designs, in addition to the optimal bandwidth.
Furthermore, we implement the non-parametric, bias-corrected robust inference proce-
dure proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to select the functional form for
the running variable (f(·), g(·) and h(·)) and to study the discontinuities at the boundary
more closely. This approach can be used in contexts with a large number of observations
very close to the treatment threshold (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). The nonparametric tech-
nique has the advantage of not relying on functional form assumptions and is commonly
used in spatial RD design (Dell 2010). To build the nonparametric function of the running
variables, we fit the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th order local polynomial regression. It is common
in regression discontinuity analysis to control for 3rd, 4th, or higher-degree polynomials of
the forcing variable. However, Gelman and Imbens (2018) argue that high-order polynomi-
als are ill-suited to regression discontinuity analysis because they lead to noisy estimates,
sensitivity to the degree of the polynomial, and poor coverage of confidence intervals. In-
stead, they recommended using estimators based on local linear or quadratic polynomials.
We present results using 2nd order polynomial and include the 1st, 3rd, and 4th order
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polynomial results in the Appendix as robustness checks.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Sharp RD Regression Results
We begin by testing the 1905 allotment boundary impact on agriculture and crop choice
variables using the sharp-RD design on the lands where ownership does not change. This
is similar to an intent-to-treat specification. Figure 2.4 plots soil quality and agricultural
activities by distance to boundary by land ownership changes. Land moving from tribal
to private ownership has higher irrigation rates, sprinkler-irrigation rates and high-value
crop rates. This implies that better land was transferred from tribal to private ownership
between 1905 and 2017.
Table 2.5 shows the empirical result of the sharp RD design using different bandwidth
and a second-order polynomial of the running variable. First, we estimate the effect on soil
productivity, using the soil productivity index as the dependent variable. Column 1 of Table
2.4 limits the sample to parcels within 1.5 miles of the 1905 allotment boundary, and columns
2 – 5 restrict it to fall within 1.25, 1, 0.75, and 0.5 miles, respectively. Column 6 reports the
allotment effect with the optimal bandwidth obtained from nonparametric specification and
column 7 indicates the optimal bandwidth. Rows 2-7 present the results for agricultural
rate, irrigation rate, sprinkler-irrigation rate, and high-value crops rate as the dependent
variable. Controlling for township, soil productivity index and elevation ensures that we
are comparing parcels in close geographic proximity with similar soil quality and elevation.
Appendix Table A.2 to Table A.8 examine robustness of the main specification to multiple
control variables of 1st, 3rd, 4th order polynomials.
The results for soil productivity indicate that the treatment coefficients are positive but
not statistically significant at the 10% level. While there are no apparent differences in rates
of agriculture and irrigation on allotted lands, allotted lands see around a 12-percentage
point lower rate of sprinkler irrigation (-0.146 to -0.102). These negative effects decrease
as the bandwidth is reduced, but remain statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence,
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the results consistently indicate that there is a negative effect of being inside the 1905
allotment border on investment in sprinkler irrigation. Moreover, the allotment coefficients
are economically similar across the four specifications of the RD polynomial,12 and we are
unable to reject that they are statistically identical (shown in Appendix Table A.6 ). The
coefficients for high-value crops also show a decrease across the 1905 allotment boundary
using both the CDL and WRL data. The negative allotment coefficients range from -0.046
to -0.037 in CDL dataset and -0.014 to -0.009 in WRL dataset.13 This implies that even
excluding a large portion of land with high-value crops that has been transferred out of
tribal control, tribal lands have lower levels of high-value crops.14
2.6.2 Fuzzy RD Regression Results
Table 2.6 reports the estimates of average treatment effect from the two-stage, fuzzy
RD approach under different bandwidth choices. In all but the last set, we consider a
fixed bandwidth from the 2017 tribal boundary to each parcel boundary, while the last set
evaluates the average treatment effects with the optimal bandwidth choice. Each cell in
this table reports an estimate of the average treatment effect for different bandwidths for a
second-order polynomial of the running variable. Appendix Table A.9 to Table A.15 examine
the robustness of the main specification, which demonstrate that the 2017 tribal boundary
effects on each dependent variable are generally similar across different polynomial orders.
As the bandwidth is increased, there is a modest decrease in the size of the treatment effect
for 2nd, 3rd and 4th polynomial order.
Table 2.6 provides a rigorous analysis of average treatment effect by considering the
effect of key covariates that might affect irrigation rate inside and outside the tribal land
12Table A.6 shows the sharp RD results of sprinkler irrigation rate using 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th order
polynomial. The negative allotment effect (ranging from -0.146 to -0.093) is statistically significant at the
1% level.
13This negative effect still exists when we choose the different order polynomials, see Table A.7 and
Table A.8 .
14 The sharp RD results are illustrated in Fig A.1 to A.5. Each subfigure shows one choice of polynomial
order plot. Based on the inspection of these plots, it is evident that the 2nd order polynomial regression
models fit the data better than 1st, 3rd and 4th order polynomial models. Higher order polynomial regression
models are more easily affected by outliers but generally provide a better fit for the data. The subfigures
uniformly confirm the presence of a significant discontinuity at 1905 allotment boundary, thus corroborating
the main findings from Table 2.5.
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boundary. While soil productivity is consistently higher inside the boundary, the rate of
irrigation, sprinkler irrigation, and high-value crops are lower. The tribal boundary effect
lowers the irrigation rate by around eighteen percentage points (-0.195 to -0.177) within the
reservation. The treatment coefficients are economically similar when we apply multiple
controls, and we are unable to reject that they are statistically identical. The treatment
effects remain similar as the bandwidth decreases and polynomial order increases (Appendix
Table A.12). Similarly, tribal land sees an approximately 31 percentage point lower (-
0.323 to -0.305) sprinkler-irrigated rate compared to non-tribal land. After controlling
for covariates, the treatment effect coefficients are still statistically significant at the 1%
level. The average treatment estimates are consistent across different bandwidth choices
and multiple covariates.
In row 1 of Table 2.6, we describe estimates of treatment effect, using soil productivity
index as the dependent variable. The tribal boundary effect increases the soil productivity
index by one full rank in subjected parcels (1.011 to 1.143). After controlling for township
and elevation, the treatment effect coefficients are still statistically significant at the 1%
level. This indicates that land quality is statistically higher on tribal land. This result
moves in the opposite direction of the selection effect we might suspect, where better land
outside the reservation has more investment and higher-value crops. Instead, we see more
irrigation and high-value crops on the (relatively) poorer land outside the reservation. Rows
6 and 7 report the high-value crop difference across the tribal boundary today. Each cell
reports the coefficient on ̂Uintah2017 for different bandwidth choices. As an example, the
average tribal boundary effect of high-value crop rate is 14.7 percentage points lower on
tribal land than on private land in the CDL data set, and 4.3 percentage points lower on
tribal land in the WRL data set.15
15The negative effect ranges from -0.153 to -0.143 in CDL dataset and -0.045 to -0.042 in WRL dataset.
The non-parametric fuzzy RD results are illustrated in Fig A.6 to A.10. Each subfigure shows one choice of
polynomial order plot. Based on the inspection of these plots, it is evident that the 2nd order polynomial
regression models fit the data better than 1st, 3rd and 4th order polynomial models.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper explores the effect of tribal land ownership on agricultural development
caused, at least in part, by insecure property rights on American Indian Reservations. Our
economic framework suggests fee-simple landowners with secure property rights are more
likely to obtain access to commercial credit and borrow money to invest capital intensive
improvements. The effect is that Uintah reservation lands see less intensive cultivation
and lower value crops. Our findings illustrate that when controlling for land quality and
geographic location, fee-simple land has an irrigation rate approximately 18 percentage
points higher than tribal land. Conditional on being irrigated, tribal land is 31 percentage
points less likely to be sprinkler-irrigated today. Moreover, fee-simple farms have higher
amounts of high-value crops within 1.5 miles of the boundary with reservation land.
Evaluating allotment effects in 1905 and tribal boundary effects together, we conclude
that agricultural irrigation development on the Uintah reservation is suppressed relative
to non-reservation land. This lack of investment is consistent with our expectation of the
effect of insecure property rights on tribal trust land. However, there are several alternative
explanations for the observed results, including issues with BIA irrigation projects, a lack of
access to USDA loan programs, and other government support and subsidies to which fee-
simple farmers may receive preferential access. The results do suggest that trust ownership
creates significant barriers to the acquisition of capital for agricultural investment. While
access to investment capital may have multiple causes, it appears clear that improving access
to capital, so tribal farmers can invest in irrigation systems at the level of their fee-simple
neighbors, is key to improving lagging agricultural development on reservations.
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Figure 2.4. Outcome variable changes between 1905 and 2017
Note: Top left: Irrigation rate difference due to land ownership changes. Top right: Soil
quality difference due to land ownership changes. Bottom left: Sprinkler-irrigation rate
difference due to land ownership changes. Bottom right: High-value crops rate difference
due to land ownership changes. Positive range of x-axis represents tribal land in 2017, and
negative range of x-axis represents private land in 2017. Red line represents the trend of
lands changing land ownership from tribal to private between 1905 and 2017. Green line
represents the trend of lands changing landownership from private to tribal between 1905
and 2017. Blue line represents the trend of lands with no change in land ownership.
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CHAPTER 3
REGIONAL WATER TRADE IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES’ LARGEST EVER AG-TO-URBAN
WATER TRANSFER
3.1 Abstract
In arid regions, water sale of water from rural to urban areas may offer a solution to
reduce costly water shortfalls among high-value urban users by transferring water originally
used for relatively low-value agriculture. However, such sales have been criticized for re-
ducing economic activity and the availability of water for ecosystem services in the rural
region. In this study, we examine the impact of an agreement in California that transferred
significant amounts of water from Imperial County to San Diego County between 2004 and
2016. We develop a general-equilibrium representation of a hydrologic-ecological-economic
system to explore the theoretical effect of this trade between regional economies. The model
predicts increases in the value of water in Imperial County and losses in employment in-
come. We test the effect empirically using a synthetic counterfactual analysis. Consistent
with the model, our estimates show a decline in the number of low- and high-skill jobs in
Imperial County corresponding to the water transfer, as well as a reduction in overall crop
production. In addition, increased crop yields indicate higher water values in the post-trade
period. The increased volume of water trading appears to have reduced water availability
in Imperial County, as predicted by the model, leading to corresponding declines in the
Salton Sea.
3.2 Introduction
Water stress in the world’s arid regions is increasing due to increasing urban water
demand and is likely to be aggravated by decreasing water availability due to climate change
40
and land use alteration (Schewe et al. 2014; Vo¨ro¨smarty et al. 2000). The reallocation of
water between different regions and sectors potentially addresses the need to meet human
water demand. However, such sales have been criticized for reducing economic activity and
the availability of water for ecosystem services in the rural region. Few studies have explored
the effects of cross-sectoral water allocation but effects are varied across the regions(e.g.,
see papers on Australia (Brooks and Harris 2008), China (Cai 2008), South Africa (Juana,
Strzepek, and Kirsten 2011), and Europe (Wimmer et al. 2015)). Wimmer et al. (2015)
and Juana, Strzepek, and Kirsten (2011) found that cross-sectoral water allocation between
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in Europe and South Africa would lead to physical
water shortage in most of water exporting region and consequently cause socioeconomic
disadvantage and aquatic ecosystem degradation. However, Cai (2008) and Brooks and
Harris (2008) studied the water allocation in Northern China and Australia and oppositely
concluded that the water allocation between sectors will generate an efficient water market
and therefore increase the sectoral output in the future.
In this study, we examine the impact of Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA)
in California that transferred significant amounts of water from Imperial County to San
Diego County between 2004 and 2016. We develop a general-equilibrium representation
of a hydrologic-ecological-economic system to explore the theoretical effect of this trade
between regional economies. This is the first study we are aware of that links general
equilibrium analysis with empirical results in examining the efficiency of a regional water
transfer agreement between agriculture and urban areas. A water transfer between agri-
culture and urban areas benefits the buyer and seller who are directly involved, but the
impact on other parties is hotly debated. Howe, Lazo, and Weber (1990) summarized po-
tential negative externalities including reductions in water quality, water availability and
instream flows. In addition, so-called pecuniary externalities have been cited as negative
trade outcomes, including the loss of jobs in the region from which water is transferred
(Mann and Wu¨stemann 2008; Holcombe and Sobel 2001). In contrast, a few studies find
positive impacts of the water transfer policy. For example, Grafton et al. (2011) argued
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that water allocation will create direct benefits for water buyers and sellers, and the benefits
increase as water availability decreases. Hadjigeorgalis and Lillywhite (2004) calculated the
gains from water allocation in Chile and found that the positive gains from water allocation
account for approximately 8 to 32 percent of the total regional GDP.
In 2003, a water transfer agreement called QSA was signed between the Imperial Irri-
gation District (IID), Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Coachella Valley
Water District, the State of California, and the United States Department of the Interior.
The intent of the QSA is to require water conservation in the IID so that water can be
transferred to other regional uses, including the San Diego County Water Authority (SD-
CWA). This agreement resulted in a water transfer between the Imperial Valley and San
Diego for a duration of 35 years, the largest agricultural to urban water transfer in the
United States.1 The QSA provides a case study to test the performance of a regional water
transfer agreement between agricultural and urban sectors.
We develop a general-equilibrium representation of a hydrologic-ecological-economic
system to model the post-trade scenario of the water exporting region. This model predicts
that in the post-trade period, a decline in water availability would result in the reduction of
both skilled and unskilled labor in the water exporting region. In contrast to the reduction
of employment, an increase in water values would be observed simultaneously in the post-
trade period.
In the empirical analysis, we apply a synthetic control methodology to test the predic-
tions of the water trading model previously developed. Two sets of outcome variables are
tested in the empirical analysis. We explore the direct effect of the water transfer between
the pre-trade and post-trade periods by comparing the crop production statistics, includ-
ing harvested acreage, crop values and crop yield per acre. Not surprisingly, we notice a
decrease in both harvest acreage and crop values in the post-trade period, which implies
that less water availability in the agricultural sector will hamper the crop production in the
water exporting region. In contrast to the cut of crop values and harvest acreage, we find
1Quantification Settlement Agreement, Water Education Foundation, http://www.watereducation.o
rg/aquapedia/quantification-settlement-agreement
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an increase of crop yield per acre of the water exporting region in the post-trade period.
The increasing crop yield per acre is an indicator of the increasing water values in the post-
trade period. We then test a set of labor statistics including skilled and unskilled labor
employment and earnings in the crop-production sector. Supporting our theoretical model,
a significant decline of both skilled and unskilled labor employment in the crop production
sector has been observed in our empirical analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows: section two provides background on the Quantification
Settlement Agreement and the fallowing program under the supervision of the QSA. Sec-
tion three describes a general equilibrium model related to the water trading and provides
predictions. Section four provides details on the econometric approach and results. Section
five concludes the paper.
3.3 Background
The QSA was signed October 10, 2003, to resolve the basic problem of California’s
excess use of Colorado River water. The Colorado River has been called the most legislated
and managed river in the world because of its multiple overlapping jurisdictions and strong
contrast in legal and administrative styles of the two neighboring countries, the United
States and Mexico (Pulwarty, Jacobs, and Dole 2005). It is the principal source of water
for irrigation and domestic use in “lower basin” states: Arizona, southern California, and
southern Nevada. Among the lower basin states, California was the only state that had
irrigation districts that could use the water immediately (Reisner 1993). Taking this into
consideration, California had been allocated 4.4 out of 7.5 million acre-feet of water among
the lower basin states under the Boulder Canyon Project Act in 1928. The California Seven
Party Agreement2 was then signed to distribute the water between irrigation districts and
urban water uses. This agreement was signed before rapid urban development happened
in lower basin states. With the increasing population and urban expansion in southern
2The California Seven Party Agreement awarded the agricultural water consumers (Imperial Irrigation
District, Palo Verde Irrigation, the federal Yuma Project, and the Coachella Valley County Water District)
senior water rights of 3.85 million acre-feet water. Out of 3.85 million acre-feet, IID diverted 2.6 million
acre-feet. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the City of Los Angeles, and San Diego
only have been secured 0.662 million acre-feet for any surplus.
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California, the water allocation under the California Seven Party Agreement was unable to
meet the needs of this growing development. The QSA was signed to reduce California’s
over-dependence on Colorado River and balance the inequality between agriculture and ur-
ban water uses. It provides for large-scale water transfers from IID to SDWA, Metropolitan
Water District (MWD) and Coachella Valley County Water District (CVWD).3 Moreover,
as part of the QSA, the state of California is obligated to undertake the restoration of the
Salton Sea ecosystem with the mitigation water saved from a voluntary fallowing program
in IID (San Diego County Water Authority 2019). Figure 3.1 shows the long-term water
transfer in California since 1970. It is clear from Figure 3.1 that Imperial County exported
the largest amount of water to the surrounding counties between 1970 and 2016. No county
is comparable to Imperial County in the amount of water exported in our sample years.
Imperial County, where IID is located, is one of the top agricultural producing counties
in the United States. Agriculture-related industry is the leading employer and a funda-
mental component of the county’s economy. The agricultural production and processing
industry were the top-ranked sector in terms of direct economic output in 2016 (Ortiz and
Dessert 2017). It contributed a total of $4.5 billion to the local economy and created 24,429
jobs in 2016. Imperial County is located in an arid region near the Mexico and Arizona
borders. It borders San Diego County to the west and Riverside County to the north. The
Colorado River is the main source of irrigation water in the county, and roughly 2.8 million
acre-feet fresh water has historically been diverted to the Imperial Irrigation District for
agricultural irrigation.
To meet the water conservation requirement of the QSA, Imperial County ultimately
has agreed to promote a 15-year voluntary fallowing program. The goal of this program is
to eliminate potential side effects to the Salton Sea caused by the large amount of water
transfer out of Imperial County. The Salton Sea is fed solely by agricultural run-off and
provides important habitat for fish and migratory birds. However, the shoreline has receded
and the lake bed has been exposed due to diminished water supply. IID sends water to the
3IID-SDCWA transfer ramps up to 200,000 acre-feet per year in 2021 for up to 75 years. IID-MWD
transfer is 105,000 acre-feet per year. IID-CVWD transfer ramps up to 103,000 acre-feet per year.
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Salton Sea to mitigate for environmental impacts associated with reduced crop irrigation
runoff. The water fallowing program requires reducing water use without decreasing crop
production. The qualified farmers are supported by payments for water conservation using
the money generated by water sold to the San Diego County Water Authority. This program
was posited to have no direct changes to the local economy due to the unchanging crop
production overall but may create costs through indirect mechanisms.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the monthly and annual fallowing volume in Imperial County
since the beginning of the water transfer. In Imperial County, the water fallowing program
officially started at the end of 2003 and only 3,445 AF water had been conserved due to the
voluntary fallowing program by December 2003. Consequently, the post-trade period for
this paper begins in 2004. The fallowing program can be separated into two periods. In the
first period (2004–2011), there is no evident seasonality of monthly volume or big spikes in
the annual volume in the Imperial County. However, in the second period (2012-2016), we
notice a clear seasonality trend in monthly volume. In addition, a spike is observed in year
2014 in Figure 3.3. This overall observation of fallowing is important for understanding our
theoretical and empirical results in Section 4 and 5.
3.4 Water Trading Model
In this section we develop a general-equilibrium representation of a simple coupled
hydrologic-ecological-economic system. These types of simple models are commonly used
in economics to provide analytical insight into complex behavior. We assume a single
regional economy (Imperial County in this case) with three sectors, the agricultural sector
(A), an ecosystem service-based sector (S), and manufacturing sector (M). Among these
three sectors, the agricultural sector is the domain sector with the biggest share of labor.
Assume regional water availability follows the equation of motion:
(3.1)
dW
dt
≡ W˙ = σ¯ − f(W )−WA −WM
W : A measure of the amount of water
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σ¯: Water inflow
f(W ): Water outflow
WA: Amount of water used in the agricultural sector
WM : Amount of water used in the manufacturing sector
The inflow and outflow terms represent areas of coupling between the economic system
and the natural system. f(W ) is a key coupling feature, linking our understanding of the
hydrologic system to the coupled model. For the purposes of analytic understanding, we
represent this term as a function of the amount of water in the system.
The regional economy consists of three primary production sectors, the agricultural
sector (QA), manufacturing sector (QM ) and ecosystem sector (QS). Each sector requires
unskilled and/or skilled labor, U and L, respectively. We assume different sectors have
preference to hire labor from different levels of skill, such that skilled labor can only be
hired in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors while unskilled labor can be hired in
the agricultural and ecosystem service sectors (e.g. services related to the natural system).
Labor is assumed to be freely mobile across sectors, meaning L¯ = LA + LM and U¯ =
UA+US . The agricultural sector produces output using labor and water, which are the same
factors used by the manufacturing sector. Different from the agricultural and manufacturing
sectors, the service sector uses unskilled labor, and water remains in the system. Hence,
the amount of water used in production is W¯ = WA + WM . Production technologies are
represented by the following production functions:
QA = QA(UA, LA,WA)(3.2)
QM = QM (LM ,WM )(3.3)
QS = QS(US ,W )(3.4)
3.4.1 Regional Trade in Water
We can add a second regional economy that works in a similar way, albeit with a
potentially different equation of motion and different ecosystem, agricultural and manufac-
turing production functions. Since we only focus on the water selling region, we only define
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the production function of the water selling region here. Given the perfect competition
assumption, zero-profit condition implies that:
P¯A = αLAγL + αWAγW + αUAγU(3.5)
P¯S = αUSγU(3.6)
P¯M = αLMγL + αWMγW(3.7)
P¯A, P¯S and P¯M denote the price of agricultural, service and manufacturing output respec-
tively, γL and γU standing for wage rate for skilled and unskilled labor, γW for the water
price, and αLi , αUi and αWi for the respective per-unit amount of skilled and unskilled labor
and water wage in sector i, i = c(A,S,M).
Moreover, full employment condition implies:
U¯ = αUAQA + αUSQS(3.8)
L¯ = αLAQA + αLMQM(3.9)
W¯ = αWAQA + αWMQM(3.10)
By total differentiating equation 3.5 , using xˆ = dx/x , we get:
(3.11) θLA γˆL + θUA γˆU + θWA γˆW =
ˆ¯PA − (θLAαˆLA + θUAαˆUA + θWAαˆWA)
where θji is the factor j’s share in sector i, e.g., θUi =
γUαUi
P¯i
. At the equilibrium, θLAαˆLA +
θUAαˆUA + θWAαˆWA = 0. Thus, we get:
(3.12) θLA γˆL + θUA γˆU + θWA γˆW =
ˆ¯PA
According to the definition of the αUS , we have relationship, αUS =
US
QS
. Solving
together with the equation 3.4 and 3.6, we get:
(3.13) γU = W × P¯S
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By total differentiating equation 3.13, we get:
(3.14) γˆU =
ˆ¯PS + Wˆ
A similar process is followed to yield:
(3.15) θLM γˆL + θWM γˆW =
ˆ¯PM
Therefore, equation 3.12, 3.14 and 3.15 can be reduced to the simple matrix form
(3.16)

θUA θWA θLA
0 θWM θLM
1 0 0
×

γˆU
γˆW
γˆL
 =

ˆ¯PA
ˆ¯PM
ˆ¯PS − Wˆ

Since the regional economy of Imperial County is a small open economy, the price is
exogenous and we have ˆ¯PA =
ˆ¯PM =
ˆ¯PS = 0.
(3.17)

θUA θWA θLA
0 θWM θLM
1 0 0
×

γˆU
γˆW
γˆL
 =

0
0
Wˆ

Solving the equation 3.17, we get:
γˆU = Wˆ(3.18)
γˆW = − θUAθLM
θWAθLM − θLAθWM
Wˆ(3.19)
γˆL =
θUAθWM
θWAθLM − θLAθWM
Wˆ(3.20)
48
The sign of γW and γL is determined by the sign of equation det θ = θWAθLM−θLAθWM .
Rewriting this equation with the factor shares, we have:
det θ = θWAθLM − θLAθWM(3.21)
=
γWαWA
P¯A
× γLαLM
P¯L
− γLαLA
P¯A
× γWαWM
P¯M
=
γLγW
P¯AP¯M
× (αWAαLM − αLAαWM )
=
γLγW
P¯AP¯M
× (WA
QA
LM
QM
− LA
QA
WM
QM
)
=
γLγWLMLA
P¯AP¯MQAQM
× (WA
LA
− WM
LM
)
Given that agricultural sector is more water intensive than the manufacturing sector
(i.e. WALA >
WM
LM
), and det θ = θWAθLM − θLAθWM > 0. Therefore, for a water exporting
region, Wˆ < 0, the relationship of labor-water equation system in Imperial County is:
γˆU = Wˆ < 0(3.22)
γˆW = − θUAθLM
θWAθLM − θLAθWM
Wˆ > 0(3.23)
γˆL =
θUAθWM
θWAθLM − θLAθWM
Wˆ < 0(3.24)
We conclude the following predictions from our theoretical model.
i) Water trading raises the return to water in the water exporting region, referring to
equation 3.23.
ii) Water trading reduces the return to skilled and unskilled labor in the water exporting
region, referring to equations 3.22 and 3.24.
In the following empirical analysis, we apply the synthetic control methodology to test
if the two predictions we proposed above hold in the water exporting region. If the two
predictions hold, we would expect to observe a statistically significant increase in the water
values and decrease in the employment of both skilled and unskilled labor in the agricultural
sector.
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3.5 Empirical Framework
We are interested in the impact of water trading on local economies and water con-
servation in California. Imperial County is the treatment unit in our model because it
consistently traded a large amount of water to San Diego County, and no other county
is comparable to it in terms of water trading volume. The selection of control groups is
crucial but difficult. If control groups are not sufficiently similar to the treatment county,
any difference in outcome variables between treated counties and control counties may be
caused by the inconsistencies in their characteristics (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
2010). The synthetic control approach uses a panel dataset to construct a convex combi-
nation of control units that best represents characteristics of the treated groups prior to
the intervention. The effect of the intervention is quantified by the difference of outcome
variables in the post-intervention period between treated and synthetic groups.
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) discuss the theoretical properties of the
synthetic control method comprehensively and our model is derived from this formulation.
Let yit be the set of outcome variables, in county i with i = 0 for Imperial County and
i > 0 for all the other counties in California, in year t for time periods t = 1, . . . , t0, . . . , T ,
where t0 is the water transfer starting year, 2004 in our case. Let y
noTrade
it be the outcome
that would be observed for county i at time t without the water trading, for counties
i = 1, . . . , N , and time periods t = 1, . . . , T . Let yTradeit be the outcome that would be
observed for county i at time t if county i is subjected to the water trading in periods t0 + 1
to T . We assume that the water trading has no effect on the outcome before 2004, i.e.,
t ∈ {1, . . . , t0} and all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Let δit = yTradeit − ynoTradeit be the effect of the water
trading for county i at time t, and let Dit be an indicator that equals to one if county i is
subjected to the water trading at time t and zero otherwise. In practice, the water trading
may have an impact prior to implementation. We assume that outcomes of the untreated
counties are not affected by the water trading implemented in the treated counties. The
observed outcome for county i at time t is:
(3.25) yit = y
noTrade
it + δitDit
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Since only the Imperial County (i = 0) is subjected to the QSA and only after period
t0 (t0 = 2004), we have:
Dit =
 1 if i = 0 and t > t00 if otherwise
We aim to estimate δ0 = (δ0,t0+1, δ0,t0+2, . . . , δ0,T )
′. For t > t0 :
(3.26) δ0t = y
noTrade
0t = y0t − ynoTrade0t
Since yTrade0t is observed, to estimate δ0t, we need to estimate y
noTrade
0t . Suppose that
ynoTradeit is given by a factor model, that is:
(3.27) ynoTradeit = ηt + θtZ i + λtµi + εit
where ηt is an unknown common time effects, Z i is a r × 1 vector of observed covariates
(not affected by the water trading policy), µi are permanent unobserved variables, θt and
λt are unknown parameters, and εit are unobserved error term with zero mean.
Consider a N × 1 vector of weights, W = (w1, . . . , wN )′ ∈ [0, 1]N , summing to 1,
to minimize distance in pre-trade characteristics between treated and weighted average of
controls. Estimated treatment effect is the simple difference between them, i.e.:
(3.28) δˆ0t = y0t −
N∑
i=1
wiyi,t for t = t0 + 1, t0 + 2, . . . , T
We may choose the vector W ∗ = (w∗1, . . . , w∗N )
′ satisfying,
(3.29)
N∑
i=1
w∗iZ i = Z0,
N∑
i=1
w∗i yi,1 = y0,1, . . . ,
N∑
i=1
w∗i yi,t0 = y0,t0
The vector W ∗ is chosen to minimize the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) of
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the set of outcome variables for the pre-trade periods.4 Once we find the vector W ∗ which
minimizes equation 3.29, we can estimate the effect of the water trading using equation
3.28.
3.6 Data
Our outcome of interest can be divided into two groups, labor market statistics in the
crop production sector and crop production statistics. We choose the subsector crop pro-
duction, because this sector is most affected by the QSA fallowing program officially started
in 2004. Four labor market indicators, including skilled labor employment, unskilled labor
employment, skilled labor earnings, and unskilled labor earnings, in the crop production
sector are selected as the outcome variables to represent the impacts on both skilled and
unskilled labor. Skilled labor here refers to the labor with high school degree or higher,
while the unskilled labor represents the labor without a high school degree. In addition,
annual acreage harvested,5 annual crop values, and annual crop yield per acre are selected
to represent the level of crop production. Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of outcome
variables and predictors. The dataset contains one treatment county, Imperial County, and
56 control counties. We exclude Alpine County in the analysis because it lacks data for
all the outcome variables in the sampling period. The synthetic control requires a set of
predictors to construct a synthetic Imperial County by calculating the weighted average of
potential control counties to best reproduce the outcomes of interest in the pre-trade pe-
riod. Figure 3.1 shows the annual aggregate level long-term water transfer among California
counties since 1970. The vertical line represents the starting year of water transfer. Thir-
teen counties, including Imperial County, have long-term water transfer programs between
1992 and 2016, but none of the other counties are comparable in volume of water delivery
to Imperial County in the post-trade period. Because the synthetic control is meant to
4The MSPE is the mean of the squared deviations between the outcome for the treated counties and
the synthetic counties in all pre-QSA periods, MSPE = 1
t0−1
∑t=t0−1
t=1 (y1,t − w∗i yi,t)2.
5Due to the high skewness and wide range of the selected outcome variables, the labor statistics, includ-
ing skilled labor employment, unskilled labor employment, skilled labor earnings, unskilled labor earnings,
and annual harvested acreage all fails to converge for the Imperial County. We apply the log transformation
to rescale them to make the relationship clearer.
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reproduce the outcomes of interest that would have been observed for Imperial County in
the absence of water transfer, and Imperial County had some transfers prior, we include all
the other counties in our donor pool. We use annual county-level panel data for the period
1992 – 2016. The QSA was passed in October of 2003, IID was only able to fallow a small
amount of land in that year, and therefore we use 2004 as the treatment start date, giving
us 12 years of pre-intervention observations (1992-2003) and 13 years of post-intervention
data (2004-2016).
Data on quarterly average employment and monthly earnings are collected from the
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program of the United States Census
Bureau.6 The LEHD provides the quarterly county-level labor information in the United
States from 1992. Quarterly employment is the estimate of the number of jobs that are
held on both the first and last day of the quarter with the same employer, while quar-
terly earnings are the average monthly earnings of employees with stable jobs, measured
in monthly earnings per capita within the one quarter. The quarterly average employment
and monthly average earnings are calculated by average the stable quarterly employment
and monthly earnings in each quarter within the same calendar year.7
The visualization of quarterly employment and monthly earnings in each quarter are
shown in Figure B.1 in the Appendix B. We notice an unusual spike of both earnings and
employment in 2002 but it goes back to usual in the following year. This indicates a data
issue of the 2002 labor data. This spike occurs in the pre-intervention period, which means
the imputation of problematic data will actually improve the reliability of the synthetic
counterfactual method. Then we use the quarterly data of 2001 and 2003 to impute the
labor data of 2002. Taking the first quarter of 2002 for an example, the imputation equations
6https://ledextract.ces.census.gov/static/data.html
7We are only able to collect quarterly data for employment and monthly average earnings for each
quarter. We turn the quarterly employment to quarterly average employment using the equation be-
low (taking the employment in 1992 as an example): Employment1992 = 1/4(EmploymentQ1−1992 +
EmploymentQ2−1992 + EmploymentQ3−1992 + EmploymentQ4−1992). I turn the monthly earnings for
each quarter data into annual data using the equation below: Earnings1992 = 1/4(EarningsQ1−1992 +
EarningsQ2−1992 + EarningsQ3−1992 + EarningsQ4−1992)
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are:
EmploymentQ1−2002 = 1/2(EmploymentQ1−2001 + EmploymentQ1−2003)
EarningsQ1−2002 = 1/2(EarningsQ1−2001 + EarningsQ1−2003)
The quarterly employment and monthly earnings in each quarter after imputation is
shown in Figure B.2 in the Appendix B. It is clear that there is no unusual spike but the
seasonality still holds in the data.
The annual acreage harvested, annual yield per acre and annual crop values are col-
lected from the annual report of USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service California
Field Office.8 This is an annual crop report compiled by the California County Agricultural
Commissioners (CCAC) with providing the most detailed annual agricultural production
data in the county level.
The set of predictors to identify the synthetic Imperial County is listed in the Table 3.1.
The predictors to control local economic development, including farm proprietor’s income
and employment,9 wage and salaries and wage salary employment,10 and proprietor’s income
and employment,11 are obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).12 The Ag-labor
ratio characteristics including the ratio of white ag-labor, the ratio of male ag-labor, the
ratio of Hispanic ag-labor and the ratio of ag-labor with high school or higher education
8https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics by State/California/Publications/AgComm/index.php
9According to BEA’s definition, farm proprietors’ income consists of the income that is received by the
sole proprietorships and the partnerships that operate farms. It excludes the income that is received by
corporate farms. Farm proprietor’s employment consists of sole proprietors and non-corporate partners in
the farm industry. The farm proprietors’ income is in millions of dollars and farm proprietors’ employment
is in thousands of jobs.
10Wage and salary employment measures the average annual number of full-time and part-time jobs in
each area by place of work. Wage and salaries is in billions of dollars and wage and salary employment is in
thousands of jobs.
11Proprietors’ income is the current-production income (including income in kind) of sole proprietor-
ships, partnerships, and tax-exempt cooperatives. Corporate directors’ fees are included in proprietors’
income. Proprietors’ income includes the interest income received by financial partnerships and the net
rental real estate income of those partnerships primarily engaged in the real estate business. The propri-
etors’ employment consists of farm proprietors’ employment and nonfarm proprietors’ employment. The
proprietor’s income is in billions of dollars and proprietor’s employment is in number of jobs.
12https://apps.bea.gov/regional/histdata/releases/1117lapi/index.cfm
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degree is obtained from the LEHD.13 The county-level agricultural characteristics are from
two different data sources. Total irrigation water withdrawals and total irrigation acres
are from the United States Geological Survey (USGS),14 while the total agricultural acres
and total agricultural sales are from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
National Agricultural Statistics Services.15 Lastly, the county-level annual agricultural
production data, including cattle values, alfalfa hay values, lettuce values, melon values and
other vegetable values, to control the agricultural output of synthetic Imperial County, is
from the annual report of USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service California Field
Office. The summary statistics of all the predictors are listed in Table 3.1.
The synthetic control methodology described earlier is used to construct a synthetic
Imperial County that best predicts the pre-QSA outcomes of interest. We estimate the
effect of water trading as the difference in the seven outcome variables between Imperial
County and synthetic Imperial County in the post-QSA period. We then perform the
placebo tests to each outcome variable following Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010)
to test whether the estimated effects of Imperial County are unusually large relative to other
counties by reapplying the same analysis to all the other control counties.
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Trends in Outcome Variables
Figure 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the comparison of annual average value of seven outcome
variables between Imperial County and the average of the other 56 counties of California
13LEHD provides the number of stable jobs in agricultural sector of different demographic characteristics
and the ratio of ag-labor is based on author’s calculation.
14https://water.usgs.gov/watuse/data/index.html. USGS maintains the county-level water use in-
formation of the nation from 1985. This data is collected every five year. The data year in our sample is
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015. Total irrigation acres is in thousands of acres and the total irrigation water
withdrawals is in Mgal/d.
15https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/#351328CE-C207-3092-ABF4-C45A89232234. The county-level
agriculture characteristics of California is collected by USDA every 5 year starting from 1997. The data year
in our sample is 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012. The total agricultural acres is in thousands of acres and the total
crop sales is in millions of dollars.
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(excluding Alpine County due to missing data).16 The blue line represents the average value
of one outcome variable of the other 56 counties in California, while the black line represents
the value of that outcome variable in Imperial County. The vertical line represents the
beginning of trade year. The two plots on the top of Figure 3.4 show that Imperial County
has significantly higher harvested acreage (logged) and crop values compared to the other 56
counties in California. The plot on the bottom of Figure 3.4 shows an unusual spike in crop
yield per acre in 2004 in our sample of the other 56 counties. This spike could be caused
by the extreme data points in one or two counties. However, synthetic control method uses
the predictors to find the optimal combination of the other 56 counties to best-replicated
synthetic Imperial County, the extreme point will be automatically weighted as zero in our
synthetic Imperial County. This argument can be supported when we take a look at the
plot on the bottom of Figure 3.6. After calculating the weighted average of the other 56
counties, there is no spike in 2004 of synthetic Imperial County (dashed line in Figure 3.6
bottom).
Two plots on the left of Figure 3.5 shows the comparison of monthly earnings between
Imperial County and the other 56 counties in California. These two plots tell us that
both skilled and unskilled labor earnings (logged) in the crop production sector is higher
than the average of the other 56 counties. In addition, the earnings for both skilled and
unskilled labor increase gradually from 1992 to 2016. The gaps of both skilled and unskilled
labor between the Imperial County and the average of the other 56 counties are reduced
within the sampling period. Two plots on the right of Figure 3.5 shows the comparison of
quarterly employment between Imperial County and the other 56 counties in California. The
skilled and unskilled labor employment are stable in the sampling period. Not surprisingly,
Imperial County has more labor employment of both skilled and unskilled labor in the crop
production sector compared to the average of the other 56 counties. This supports that
average value of the other 56 counties in California is a suitable control group for Imperial
County to study the seven selected outcome variables. The big gaps between Imperial
16All the other counties in California refers to the other 56 counties except Imperial County (treatment
county) and Alpine County (excluded due to missing values).
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County and the other 56 counties motivate us to apply the synthetic control methodology
to search for a comparable synthetic Imperial County, especially in the pre-trade period.
The synthetic Imperial County is constructed by a convex combination of the other
56 counties that most closely predicts Imperial County in terms of outcome variables in
the pre-trade period. Table 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate predict means of observed covariates
which is not affected by water transfer. The first column represents the mean of observed
covariates of Imperial County, while the last column represents the average of the other
56 control counties. There is an evident difference of all the observed covariates between
Imperial County and average of the other 56 control counties. However, after the convex
combination of the other 56 control counties, the predict means of synthetic Imperial County
is much similar to the predict means of Imperial County in most of observed covariates. For
example, farm proprietors’ income in the pre-trade period is much lower in the average of
the 56 controls ($71,573) than in Imperial County ($240,711), but it is closer in synthetic
Imperial County ($244,673) (see Table 3.2).
However, some observed covariates, such as total irrigation water withdrawals, cannot
reproduce the pre-trade scenario accurately with the mean of 2088.288 Mgal/d in Imperial
County and 411.734 Mgal/d in average of 56 controls and 1336.1 Mgal/d in the synthetic
Imperial County for the test of harvested acreage (logged) (see Table 3.3 row 11). To
minimize the MSPE of outcome variables during the pre-trade period, different weights of
each observed covariates are signed. For example, since total irrigation water withdrawals
fails to mirror the pre-trade scenario accurately, it does not have considerable weights
(weights varying from 0 to 0.076) to predict the outcome variables of synthetic Imperial
County in the pre-trade period (see Table 3.4 row 11).
Table 3.5 shows the weights of each county in the synthetic Imperial County. The
column 1 to 7 illustrate the best combination of counties to reproduce the synthetic Imperial
County for different outcome variables. We hide the counties with zero weight in this table
to diminish the table size. For example, the column 1 tells us that the combination of Inyo,
Kings, Mono, Monterey and Tulare will minimize the MSPE in the pre-trade period when
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reproducing the synthetic Imperial County.
3.7.2 Impacts on Crop Production
Figure 3.6 demonstrates the time paths of outcome variables related to crop production
output between Imperial County and the synthetic Imperial County in the sample period.
The annual harvested acreage, annual crop values and annual yield per acre are reported
here. These three variables are closely affected by the fallowing program and we gather these
three variables to indicate the direct impact of fallowing program but using our synthetic
counterfactual.
The synthetic Imperial County is able to successfully track the trajectory of Imperial
County in the pre-trade period. Compared to the significant gaps between the outcome
variables in the pre-trade period in Figure 3.4, this implies that the synthetic Imperial
County provides an approximately accurate estimate of selected outcome variables in the
scenario in the absence of the water transfer. The time path of harvested acreage (logged)
starts to diverge around 2007, three years after starting transfer water (See subfigure on
the top). What’s more, the gap between the Imperial County and the synthetic Imperial
County becomes larger the longer time has passed post water transfer. It shows up more
clearly when we plot the gap between Imperial County and synthetic Imperial County. The
gap plots can be found in Figure 3.7. Since a good match of Imperial County and synthetic
Imperial County in the pre-trade period will show a small gap between them, Figure 3.7
states that two of the outcome variables, the annual harvested acreage (logged) and annual
crop values, both have a relatively small gap in the pre-trade period and an obviously
negative gap in the post-trade period. This suggests that the overall estimated effect of
water transfer on the annual harvested acres and annual crop values is negative in Imperial
County.
When we compare the gap plots of harvested acreage (logged) and annual crop values
to the amount of land fallowed in Figure 3.3, we notice striking similarities. This suggests
that the harvested acreage and crop value decreases could be the result of the fallowed land
being taken out of production. In particular, we observe a sharp decrease in all three plots
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around the year of 2014, which was the year with the greatest amount of fallowing. These
results give us some confidence in the ability of our synthetic counterfactual to pick up
changes as a result of the water transfer.
3.7.3 Labor in the Crop Production Sector
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the time path and gap plots of labor statistics between Imperial
County and synthetic Imperial County. Figure 3.8 left panel top to bottom shows the time
paths of skilled labor earnings and unskilled labor earnings separately. There are no evident
differences in skilled labor earnings between Imperial County and synthetic Imperial County,
but a small negative effect can be found in the unskilled labor earnings in the post-QSA
period. This finding can be supported when we switch to the gap plots in Figure 3.9 (left
panel top to bottom). In contrast to the invisible gaps in the earnings, we observe evidently
negative gaps in both skilled and unskilled labor employment in both 3.8 and 3.9 (right
panel top to bottom).
Again, to compare the gap plots of labor statistics with the fallowing land in Figure
3.3, we find an even more interesting relationship existing between the skilled and unskilled
labor employment and the land fallowed each year. The unskilled labor employment strictly
follows the very similar trajectory of Figure 2B, while the skilled labor employment loosely
follows this trajectory at the same time. To understand this, we need to record our water
trading model in the sector three, especially equation 3.22 and 3.24. What the model tells
us is that the amount of the skilled and unskilled labor loss in the water exporting region
ideally should be equal to the amount of water trading. These interesting results suggest
that the fallowing program might have a negative impact to both the skilled and unskilled
labor employment in the water selling region, in our case, Imperial County. However, since
the farmers will get the direct benefits, such as water payment, due to the water trading,
the QSA program will not affect the labor earnings at the visible level. However, these
figures tell us nothing about the significance of our results, that is, we are not able to tell
if these gaps plot in the Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.9 are statistically significant from zero or
not in the post-trade period. In the next section, we run placebo tests that can be used for
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hypothesis testing.
3.8 Placebo Tests
In order to get the significance level of our estimation, we perform a placebo test by
reapplying the synthetic control method to each county that is not affected by QSA or any
comparable large-scale water transfer program during the sampling period. The placebo
test is suggested by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) in their paper evaluating
the effect of California’s tobacco control program. The reason for the placebo test is to see
whether effects similar in or of larger magnitude exist for the same treatment date in the
control counties. If the control counties have comparable or larger magnitude of estimated
effects when treating them as treatment counties, then the estimated effects of our selected
outcome variable in the post-trade period are not statistically significant. If the differences
of the control counties are smaller than Imperial County, it provides evidence of significance.
The p-value from the test can be interpreted as “the probability of obtaining an estimate
at least as large as the one obtained for the unit representing the case of interest when the
intervention is reassigned at random in the data set” (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
2015, p. 500).
To conduct the placebo test we run the synthetic control method separately on each
control county treating them as a treatment county when using all the other remaining
counties, including Imperial County, as before. The gap between the placebo county and
its synthetic county should be randomly signed in the results because none of the control
counties is actually exposed to the fallowing program. We can evaluate the probability that
the treatment effect exists by comparing the gap between Imperial County and synthetic
Imperial County (black line) to the gaps of the placebo counties and their synthetic controls
(grey lines). The placebo counties with the large pre-trade MSPE, we define as the poorly
fitted units. A large pre-trade MSPE value indicates that the pre-trade time path of this
placebo county is not accurately reproduced by the convex combination of the remaining 56
controls. Hence, these poorly fitted values should be deleted when comparing significance
level of treatment effect. We exclude the counties that have pre-trade MSPE of more than
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20 times, 10 times, 5 times, and 2 times the MSPE of Imperial County. The results with
counties of more than two times pre-trade MSPE of Imperial County are reported in the
Figure 3.10 and 3.11, while the other results can be found in Figure B.3 to B.10 in the
Appendix B. The 3.10 and 3.11 suggest that among the counties remaining in the figure,
the Imperial County gap line is about the most unusual line in crop values (see Figure 3.10),
skilled labor employment and unskilled labor employment.
Another way to evaluate the significance of the Imperial County gap relative to the
gaps obtained from placebo runs is to rank the ratios of post/pre-trade MSPE or RMSPE.
The advantage of this methodology is that it removes choosing a cut-off for the exclusion of
poorly fitted placebo runs. Hence, the rank of the MSPE or RMSPE ratio can represents
the significant level of the treatment effects.
Figures 3.12 to 3.18 show the rank of MSPE and RMSPE ratio of different outcome
variables. The plot of MSPE ratio rank is presented on the left of each figure, while the
plot of RMSPE ratio rank is presented on the right. The ratio for Imperial County ranked
on the top in the skilled labor employment (logged) (see Figure 3.14). Post-trade MSPE is
about 25 times the MSPE for the pre-trade period. Only Tuolumne and Santa Barbara are
ranked higher than it. If one county were to assign the water transfer program at random
in the dataset, its probability of obtaining a post/pre-trade MSPE or RMSPE ratio as
large as Imperial County is 3/55 = 5.5%. However, surprisingly, the ranks of the other two
significant outcome variables, unskilled labor employment and crop values, are not high in
the second placebo test, with a 12/54 = 22.2% in unskilled labor employment and 13/53 =
24.5% in crop value. The reason could be that even Imperial County has relative large post-
trade MSPE in unskilled labor employment and crop values, but its pre-MSPEs of these two
outcome variables are relative large due to limited sample size and short pre-trade sample
years. We can improve the results of these two variables by adding more sampling year or
extending our sample from California to the West of US.
3.9 Conclusion
This paper explores the causal effect of the largest agriculture-to-urban water transfer in
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US history. A general-equilibrium representation of a simple coupled hydrologic-ecological-
economic system is constructed in the theoretical section. The water trading model is
between two small open economies of three separate sectors (Agricultural, Manufacturing,
and Ecosystem sectors) in each economy. One economy is rural with agricultural sector
as the domain sector which has the biggest share of labor. The rural economy is in a
water abundant region exporting water to the urban economy. The water trading model
demonstrates that after exporting a large amount of water, the return to water in the water
exporting region will increase while the return to skilled and unskilled labor in the water
exporting region will decrease.
The synthetic control methodology is apply to test the validity of the water trading
model. The goal of the empirical framework is to explore empirically whether the existence
of water transfer program will negatively impact the labor employment and earnings in the
crop production sector. Our results show that there is a decline in the number of skilled
and unskilled jobs in Imperial County after the water transfer while the average earnings
of both skilled and unskilled labor do not change after trade. These results imply that due
to benefits of water payment from water trading, the loss of water will not affect the labor
earnings at the visible level in the water exporting region. However, voluntary fallowing
program decreases the demand of both skilled and unskilled on-farm labors in the water
exporting region. As a results of water trading, labor will move in the same direction as
water. At the same time, the overall crop production shrinks in response to limited water
availability. We observe a statistically siginificant decrease of crop value in the Imperial
County after water transfer. The higher return to water is indicated by the increased crop
yields, but this result is not statistically significant. This result can be improved by adding
more pre-trade sample years or extending the research region from California to the West
of US.
The increased volume of water trading appears to have reduced water availability in
Imperial County, as predicted by the model, leading to corresponding declines in the Salton
Sea. One of the important goals of this large-scale water transfer program is to restore the
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Salton Sea ecosystem with the mitigation water saved from efficient irrigation practice in
IID. However, this year is the 15th anniversary of the signing of the QSA, the problems
Salton Sea is facing still remain unsolved. Less water availability caused by the large water
transfer program has potentially reduced the water inflow of Salton Sea. This might worsen
the salinity problem of Salton Sea because there is no outlet for Salton Sea and water is
lost only through evaporation.
In conclusion, reductions in employment and environmental damage may be attributable
to water transfers. In order to mitigate the rapid decline of both skilled and unskilled labor,
more job opportunites should be created in the water exporting region. Instead of letting
seasonally unemployed agricultural labor move out of the region, unemployed labor because
of fallowing program should be placed into other related sectors. Another alternative policy
could focus on targeting low agricultural and environmental productivity water for transfers
to minimize these impacts while still creating gains from trade.
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev.
Outcome Variables
Skilled Labor Employment 1,425 673.74 932.65
Unskilled Labor Employment 1,425 621.82 911.87
Skilled Labor Monthly Earnings 1,425 6,406.74 2,572.03
Unskilled Labor Monthly Earnings 1,425 1,608.76 603.28
Log (Harvested Acreage) 1,425 12.39 2.07
Annual Yield (per acre) 1,425 195.09 449.74
Crop Value (Million Dollars) 1,425 503.1 848.54
Predictors
Farm proprietors’ income 1,425 110.48 216.49
Farm proprietors’ employment 1,425 1.32 1.41
wage and salary employment 1,425 268.66 619.83
wage and salary 1,425 12.33 30.5
proprietors’ employment 1,425 73.5 174.48
proprietors’ income 1,425 2.43 6.03
White Ag-labor ratio 1,425 0.8 0.2
Male Ag-labor ratio 1,425 0.66 0.2
Hispanic Ag-labor ratio 1,425 0.49 0.19
High school or higher Ag-labor ratio 1,425 0.45 0.18
Total irrigation water withdrawals 285 441.15 651.43
Total irrigation acres 285 169.57 241.5
Total agriculture acres 222 304.44 321.35
Total crop sales 216 413.62 612.62
Annual Cattle Values 1,425 41.5 92.86
Annual Alfalfa Hay Values 1,425 17.52 35.33
Annual Lettuce Values 1,425 14.15 80.77
Annual Melons Values 1,425 11.55 38.41
Annual Other Vegetable Values 1,425 13.6 34.02
Note: Employment and Earnings are all in quarterly average. An-
nual crop, cattle, alfalfa hay, lettuce, melons, and other vegetable val-
ues are all in millions of dollars. Total irrigation water withdrawals
and total irrigation acres are in year 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015.
Total agriculture acres and total crop sales are in year1997, 2002,
2007, 2012. All the other variables are in 1992-2016. Farm propri-
etorO˜s income and employment, wage and salary employment and
proprietorO˜s employment are in thousands, while wage and salary
and proprietorO˜s income are in millions. Total agriculture acres is in
thousands, and total crop sales, annual cattle values, annual alfalfa
hay values, annual lettuce values, annual melon values and annual
other vegetable values are in millions of dollars.
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Figure 3.1. Long term water transfer in California since 1970
Note: The water transfer data is aggregated at county-level. In most of case, there are
more than one transfer happening in the county within the same data year. County-level
data is based on authors’ calculation. The vertical line represents the QSA effective year,
2004. Data source: the data is summarized from summary report written by Hanak and
Stryjewski (2012).
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Figure 3.4. Comparison of crop production statistics
Note: All the other counties in the California here refers to all the other 56 counties except
Imperial and Alpine County in California. The vertical line represents the QSA effective
year, 2004.
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Figure 3.5. Comparison of labor statistics in crop production sector
Note: All the employment and earnings data are calculated by the quarterly av-
erage. Earnings are in dollars and Employment is in the number of jobs. The
vertical line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
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Figure 3.6. Time path in crop production statistics
Note: The crop value is in millions of dollars. The vertical line represents the QSA effective
year, 2004.
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Figure 3.7. Gap plots in crop production statistics
Note: The crop value is in millions of dollars. The vertical line represents the QSA effective
year, 2004.
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Figure 3.8. Time path in labor statistics in crop production sector
Note: All the employment and earnings data are calculated by the quarterly average. Earn-
ings is in dollars and Employment is in the number of jobs. The vertical line represents the
QSA effective year, 2004.
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Figure 3.9. Gap plots in labor statistics in crop production sector
Note: All the employment and earnings data are calculated by the quarterly average. Earn-
ings is in dollars and Employment is in the number of jobs. The vertical line represents the
QSA effective year, 2004.
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Figure 3.10. Restricted sample size placebo test plots in crop production
Note: The county with pre-QSA MSPE greater than 2 times Imperial County pre-QSA
MSPE are excluded from the sample. The crop value is in millions of dollars. The vertical
line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
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Figure 3.11. Restricted sample size placebo test plots in labor statistics in
crop production sector
Note: The county with pre-QSA MSPE greater than 2 times Imperial County pre-QSA
MSPE are excluded from the sample. All the employment and earnings data are calculated
by the quarterly average. Earnings is in dollars and Employment is in the number of jobs.
The vertical line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
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CHAPTER 4
ORGANIC FARMING IN SHALE STATES: A COLORADO CASE STUDY
4.1 Abstract
Air, soil, and water pollution caused by every stage of developing and operating a
fracking well could create substantial difficulties in obtaining and maintaining organic certi-
fication. More importantly, consumers’ awareness of potential soil and water contaminations
from fracking will make the organic products less marketable and further harm the organic
farms around drilling pads. This paper explores the causal impacts of shale development
on organic farming. A novel geospatial dataset of organic farm location and certification
duration was created and used to find organic farms present variant distribution patterns
across different shale states. Colorado, with the highest exposure possibility, suffers the
most from the risk from fracking, and there is a small but significant negative impact on
maintaining organic certification.
4.2 Introduction
Hydraulic fracturing, more commonly known as fracking, has caused a dramatic boom
in the United States gas production since 2005, when the process was made exempt from
important pro- visions, such as the Clean Water Act and other environmental and public
health protections. Together with the production boom, rising concern about the negative
societal impact of fracking has been documented. For example, the potential health risk and
environmental damage caused by fracking has been widely studied in the Environmental
Science field since 2010 (Allred et al. 2015; Vidic et al. 2013; McKenzie et al. 2012). More
recently, hedonic rent frameworks have been used to explore the overall impact of gas
development on local housing value declines (Rakitan 2018; Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and
Timmins 2015). However, the overall effect of shale development on agriculture is uncertain
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and under-studied.
The shale states, which are rich in gas development, are also agriculturally rich (Hitaj
et al. 2014). Eight states, including Texas, North Dakota, Colorado, Wyoming, Louisiana,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio, have been defined as shale states.1 The cash brought
in by the oil and gas industry increases farmers’ wealth through lease and royalty payments,
but fracking hampers agricultural production by competing for water and labor with the
local agricultural sector and potentially polluting the surrounding environment (Weber,
Brown, and Pender 2013). In shale states, agriculture dominates surface land use, while
energy development competes for water and labor (Hitaj, Boslett, and Weber 2017) and
weakens the profitability of farms, particularly in rural and dry areas. For example, Hi-
taj, Boslett, and Weber (2017) documented that hydraulic fracturing used more water than
farming, and the greatest displacement occurred in states that allow farmers to forgo irrigat-
ing, thereby allowing them to sell water to energy firms. Farah (2017) in Alberta, Canada,
found a negative impact of hydraulic fracturing on irrigated crop production during the
agriculturally active months, using wells and agricultural productivity data. However, the
relationship between hydraulic fracturing on organic farming has not yet been studied.
Organic food sales have been expanding rapidly since 2000 in the United States (Greene
et al. 2017). Generally, certified organic food is more expensive than the conventional
agricultural products on the market. The high price premium encourages many conventional
farmers to convert to organic farm (Sustainable Agriculture Research & Education 2012).
The ideal experiment suggests that organic production has similar output, but lower cost
compared to conventional production. Using Agricultural Resource Management Survey
(ARMS) data in 2006 and 2009, McBride and Greene (2008) and McBride et al. (2012)
found that organic soybeans and wheat both have higher returns compared to conventional
soybeans and wheat. Even though production costs are relatively higher and annual yields
are much lower than the conventional products, the returns of organic production remain
1According to the United States Energy Information Administration, seven regions account for 92% of
the country’s shale oil growth in recent year. Table 4.3 is obtained from website: https://www.fool.com
/investing/2017/03/25/which-us-states-produce-the-most-shale-oil.aspx, and the original data is
from United States Energy Information Administration.
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high because of the high price premiums. Organic farmers have incentives to maintain
organic certification as a result of high price premiums.
However, compared to conventional productions, organic productions seem to have
higher risk. Hanson et al. (2004) mentioned two main risks that vary between organic and
conventional production in their six focus group discussions with organic farmers. The
first risk unique to organic farmers is that the opportunity cost of organic premium is
too high. Organic farmers enjoy the price premiums only after they acquired the organic
certification. The transition period is usually three years, and the certification itself could
cost them hundreds or even thousands of dollars. Additionally, the organic certification
is not guaranteed after the transition period. The second risk is that in order to follow
the federal organic standards, the organic production system land and products are more
vulnerable to contamination.
If a negative relationship between agricultural production and shale development exists,
organic farms should be more sensitive than conventional farms since they will not only be
affected by air, soil, and water pollution, but by every stage of developing and operating
a fracking well (Royte 2012; Debatin 2014). These farms will also be heavily harmed by
consumers’ awareness of potential soil and water contamination from fracking. Ong (2014)
states that even a single drill pad on the horizon of an organic farm substantially increases
the possibility of the erosion of the marketability of certified organic products. Potential
organic adopters may take the appearance of wells as a signal of the difficulty in obtaining
certification, and current organic operators may decide against maintaining certification in
the face of perceived contamination.
In this study, the survival length of maintaining organic certification in Colorado is
examined using two novel survival models: Instrumental Variable Estimation in a Survival
Analysis and a Joint Model with an endogenous time-dependent variable. Organic farm
locations in shale states are geocoded using data from the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) Organic Integrity Database (OID).2 In Colorado, organic farms are
clustered near gas wells. In other states, such as Pennsylvania, organic farms and gas
2https://organic.ams.usda.gov/Integrity/Reports/DataHistory.aspx
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wells are separated. There is a lack of correspondence between oil and gas deposits and
good agricultural land. Within the same shale state, fracking well placement decisions and
regulations may be impacted by the presence of traditional and/or organic agriculture or
organic agriculture. The United States Tight Oil and Gas Plays Map is used to show the
geologic formations with available shale oil and gas deposits as an instrumental variable on
well placement to eliminate the potential bias of county regulations.
The results show that Colorado has the most active fracking wells around organic
farms of all the shale states, and that these farms face a higher risk of organic certification
loss. There was a small but significant negative impact of fracking on maintaining organic
certification in both short- and long-distance-from-well measures. Prior studies have found
limited evidence that shale development has negative impacts to agricultural development
(see for example, Rakitan 2018; Farah 2017; Hitaj, Boslett, and Weber 2017). However,
none of these studies explore the impact of gas development to organic farming using farm-
level dataset.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background information on organic
farm and energy regulations. Section 3 describes the data set construction while Section 4
provides details on the empirical design and econometric approach. The econometric results
are provided in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes this work.
4.3 Background
4.3.1 Impacts of Fracking on Organic Farming
Organic farms aren’t allowed to use synthetic chemicals such as fertilizers and pesti-
cides, and the production processes rely heavily on the use of cover crops, crop rotation,
manure application, etc. In order to maintain the quality of organic products, organic
farmers face additional challenges due to the restrictions and regulations from the National
Organic Program (NOP), which defines national standards for the organic production sys-
tem. These restrictions include stricter requirements on land quality. Qualified organic
farms are required to have no prohibited substances applied for a period of three years im-
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mediately preceding harvest of the crops. They must also have distinct, defined boundaries
and buffer zones, such as runoff diversions to prevent the unintended application of a pro-
hibited substance to the crop or contact with a prohibited substance applied to adjoining
land that is not under organic management (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2009). The
land requirements regulated by the NOP make location selection of organic farms more
sensitive than non-organic agriculture to environmental containments generated by energy
development, which can affect the quality of organic production through air and water
emitted from the adjacent fracking wells.
By law, the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) National Organic Program accred-
its and oversees organizations as certifiers to enforce the USDA organic regulations (U.S.
Department of Agriculture 2019). The certifiers inspect every certified organic farm and
collect samples to check for prohibited substances at least annually. The organic certifi-
cation will be suspended or revoked if the organic farms fail to comply with the Organic
Production and Handling Requirements. A suspended or revoked operation cannot sell,
label, or represent its products as having been organically produced or handled, and this
information will be recorded in the OID.
Pollution of the surrounding environment can occur at almost every stage of develop-
ing and operating a fracking well. Radioactive material, volatile organic compounds, and
petrochemicals from the adjacent wells could containment air, soil, and both ground and
surface water used by surrounding organic farms (Royte 2012). Debatin (2014) depicted
that fracking wastewater disposal consequently results in a nearby organic farmer selling
their operation, due to the fear of losing organic certification. Essentially, organic inspectors
or certification agencies have the right to take soil, product, or tissue samples at any time to
verify compliance with the NOP. If any prohibited substances, including fracking chemicals,
are detected on a certified organic farm, the producer may have to wait at least three years
before becoming eligible for recertification (Kuhlman 2014). The concern about fracking
has been widely raised among organic farmers in both in New York and Ohio (Gsell 2012;
Kuhlman 2014).
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4.3.2 Fluid Disclosure Regulation and Trade Secret Protection
During the fracking process, a large number of chemical additives will be injected into
the fracking wells to open the fissures in the shale formation by increasing the well pressure.
The chemical additives mixed with fracking fluid could potentially soak into nearby aquifers
and contaminate both surface and ground water. The harmful additives, if overused, could
pollute the surrounding environment and even threaten human health (Adgate, Goldstein,
and McKenzie 2014; Finkel and Law 2011). Despite the environmental issues caused by
the fracking fluids, the Energy Policy Act passed by Congress in 2005 forbade the EPA
from regulating fracking fluids. Since then, the right to regulate fracking fluid has been
turned over to state governments. The Department of Energy has advocated for a nation-
wide voluntary fracking chemical disclosure project, consisting of a listing of the chemical
constituents in fracking fluid on FracFocus website. However, the FracFocus only identifies
59 chemical additives most commonly used in fracking processes and there are still a large
number of undisclosed additives (Marie 2017). Twenty-three state governments, including
Colorado, have required the fracking companies to disclose chemicals used. Due to the ex-
istence of trade secret laws, most of the fracking companies do not have to fully report all
the chemicals, especially commercial additive products, used in the fracking process. Even
if the drilling companies disclose the chemical additives, the information they are providing
is in general terms, such as “friction reducer” or “clay stabilizer” (Craven 2013). More im-
portantly, the vague descriptive information causes more difficulties in preventing potential
risks resulting from chemical additives. This unknown nature of the process increases the
risk to organic farmers that contamination will disrupt their organic certification.
In the state of Colorado, chemicals used in fracking are considered a trade secret;
therefore, the drilling companies may indicate that on the chemical disclosure registry form
and provide only the chemical family (Murrill and Vann 2012). In order to encourage
the innovation of new products and environmentally friendly fluids in the drilling industry,
only state regulators and health professionals have the right to ask for chemical disclosure
in emergency situations. The existence of trade secret protection provides an obstacle to
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implement state-level fluid disclosure regulation and encourages the development of fracking
in shale states. This implies that if an organic farmer wants to avoid the potential of
losing certification around the drilling location, it would cost more to conduct additional
monitoring, as the additive’s information is not fully transparent to the public. If the
farm fails to pass the annual accrediting process from USDA, organic certification will
be suspended or revoked. This is another potential cost in maintaining an organic farm.
Additionally, if there is any evidence showing that the organic farms have violated the
regulations, or have represented products as organic without certification, penalties can be
assessed up to $17,952 per violation.3
4.4 Methodology
The methodology used in this study can be divided into three parts, starting with a
simple Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival curve of the time an organic farm commences
operation until it fails to be certified. In the second section, an instrumental variable (IV)
approach in a survival analysis context is used to evaluate the causal effect of fracking on
organic certification using time-to-event data. In the survival model with and without IV,
the exposure to fracking wells is treated as a time-fixed variable, which is not allowed to
change during the observation time. In fact, the real data indicates that the active fracking
well number changes over time. Lastly, in order to estimate the impact, the exposure
to fracking wells is treated as a time-dependent variable using the Joint Model to more
accurately explore the impact of fracking on maintaining organic farm certification.
4.4.1 Kaplan-Meier Estimator
Organic farms in Colorado were divided into two groups in the simple Kaplan-Meier
estimator. One group is comprised of the organic farms located on the shale plays; the
other group is those organic farms not located on the shale plays. The goal of Kaplan-
Meier estimator is to estimate the survival curve of the two groups from the organic farm
samples. The survival probability is calculated as the number of organic farms surviving
3https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/enforcement/organic
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divided by number of organic farms at risk. Kaplan-Meier is a simple way to explore the
difference between survival curves and determine whether there is a statistically significant
difference between the groups.
The Kaplan-Meier estimator is defined as
(4.1) ˆS(t) =
∏
Ti≤t
(1− 1
Y (T (i))
)
where Ti is the event time for organic farm i, and Y (Ti) is the number of organic farms at
risk before time Ti.
4.4.2 Instrumental Variable Approach in Survival Analysis
An instrumental variable approach is introduced here to solve the endogeneity problem
caused by a lack of correspondence between oil and gas deposits and good agricultural land.
The presence of agriculture or organic agriculture may affect the well placement decision and
regulations. Organic farmers within a county specialized in drilling (fracking county) would
value the organic certification differently than farmers in a county specialized in agricultural
production (agriculture-based county), and farmers’ behavior to the certification risk from
surrounding drill pads will reflect that difference. For example, organic farmers in a fracking
county might have higher tolerance to fracking than organic farmers in an agriculture-based
county. In this case, length of maintaining an organic certification clearly depends on the
density of fracking wells around each organic farm, but the density of fracking wells is not
exogenously given since they are determined in part by the farmers’ attitude of organic
certification in different counties. A suitable instrument for the density of fracking wells
is a variable that is correlated with density of fracking wells but does not directly affect
length of maintaining an organic certification. An obvious candidate is a variable that
affects oil and gas deposits, since this also affects density of fracking wells, but is not a
direct determinant of the length of maintaining an organic certification. The United States
Tight Oil and Gas Plays Map is treated as an instrumental variable to eliminate the bias
coming from heterogeneity of counties.
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A two-stage regression approach is introduced here. The two-stage approach is analo-
gous to the two stages least squares approach commonly used for IV estimation in a linear
model. The fitted value from a first stage regression of the exposure on the IV is entered
in place of the exposure in the second stage hazard model to recover the causal effect (see
for instance Lergenmuller (2017), who applies this approach using the Norwegian Mother
and Child Cohort Study data to explore the effect of mothers’ body mass index on the
pregnancy duration).
The exposure to fracking affects the response of certificated status, and the instrumen-
tal variable shale plays affects the response of certified status only through the exposure
to fracking. In addition, unobservable and observable factors affect both exposure and re-
sponse, but not the instrument. In order to meet the requirements of IV, “shale plays” need
to be:
1) Unconditionally independent of the unobservable factors. This condition is not
testable.
2) Dependent with the endogenous explanatory variable of interest “exposure”. We can
test this assumption by performing the likelihood ratio test, and by looking at the adjusted
R-squared of a linear regression between the exposure and the “shale plays”. For this paper,
the assumption intuitively makes sense as the density of fracking wells partly depends on
the shale plays.
3) Conditional on observable, unobservable and “exposure” variables, “shale plays” has
to be independent of the response. This assumption is not testable. However, “shale plays”
was assigned before the energy development boom in early 2000s. One farm will not lose
its organic certification just because it is located on the shale plays. It will have possibil-
ity to lose its organic certification if, and only if, it is polluted, or the owner voluntarily
discontinues organic agriculture.
1. First stage
dji is predicted by using linear regression model:
(4.2) E[dji |plays, aquifer] = β0 + β1plays+ β
′
xaquifer
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Where dji is an outcome variable of interest, equal to the number of active wells located
within i−mile buffer zone in state j. plays is an instrumental variable, equal to one if the
organic farm is located on the shale plays. aquifer is to control for the heterogeneity of
aquifers. In order to capture the impact of active fracking wells properly, 1−mile, 3−mile,
5 − mile, 10 − mile were selected as bandwidths in Colorado. The predicted value of dji
obtained from this model is
ˆ
dji .
2. Second stage
Before performing the second stage, Aalen’s Additive Hazard Model is fitted with all
the observed variables. The model without IV is displayed as:
(4.3) h[t|dji , plays, aquifer] = h0(t) + γd(t)dji + γ
′
x(t)aquifer
where γ
′
x(t) is selected corresponding to the selection of the covariate, aquifer. The two
variables of interest are the estimated cumulative baseline hazard ˆH0(t) and the estimated
cumulative parameter for dji ,
ˆγd(t). A non-parametric strategy in the survival analysis is
used here. The non-parametric approach focuses on estimation of the regression coefficients
γ leaving the baseline hazard h0(t) completely unrestricted (Cox 1975).
The second stage model with fitted values obtained from first stage is:
(4.4) h[t|plays, aquifer] = hs0(t) + γd(t) ˆdji + γ
′
x(t)aquifer
where γ
′
x(t) and aquifer are the same as illustrated above, and where
ˆ
dji is the predicted
value of dji using first stage model. The variables of interest remain the same as the Aalen
Additive Model without IV as above. They are the estimated cumulative baseline hazard
ˆH0(t) and the estimated cumulative parameter for d
j
i ,
ˆγd(t). h
s
0(t) is a baseline hazard
function with two-stage approach.
3. Validity of IV
In order to check the validity of assumption 2), the correlation between dji and plays
was determined. Table 4.1 shows the correlation between the instrument and the exposure,
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dji . The instrument was found to be relatively weak within narrow bandwidths selection
such as 1−mile and 3−mile, with correlations ranging from 0.195 to 0.217. The correlations
of 10−mile bandwidth selection are comparatively high for all four bandwidths.
Table 4.2 shows that the instrument, plays, is statistically significant within all the
selected bandwidth choices. However, the adjusted − R2 of the smaller bandwidth choice
is relatively small. For example, the reported adjusted−R2 of 5−mile bandwidth choice
is about 0.053, which means that the model only explains about 5% of the variation in the
response, and so the instrument will be rather weak. Table C.1 inthe Appendix show the
likelihood ratio test results. The instrument, plays, shows statistical significance at 99%
level with all the bandwidth choices in Colorado.
4.4.3 Joint Model with Time-dependent Covariates
In the survival model with and without IV, active well impact has been treated as
a time-fixed variable, meaning it is not allowed to change over time. However, the real
number of active fracking wells does change over time. Figure 4.6 depicts how the selected
characteristics of active fracking wells change within a 20−mile buffer of sixteen sampled
organic farms. Four different variables were selected as indicators to evaluate the impact of
active fracking wells. The well number is calculated by summing all active fracking wells
within the defined time frame (0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 years from the certification of the nearest
organic farm). The production days variable is the sum of total production days of the
active wells around the nearest organic farm. Our observation here is organic farms in
Colorado. If there are two farms near one well, that well can only be counted to the nearest
farm. The weighted distance is defined as the reciprocal of the distance of each active well
to its nearest organic farm. It is easy to understand that there is a negative correlation
between the distance of each well to an organic farm; that is, the larger distance from an
organic farm, the less impact this active well will have on that farm. Hence, the sum of the
reciprocal of distance (
∑ 1
distance) is used to evaluate the impact of each active fracking well
on its nearest organic farm. The last variable to evaluate the impact of active fracking well is
called indicator, which is the sum of production days over distance (
∑ production day
distance ). The
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length of production days is positively correlated with the impact of the active fracking well,
while the distance is negatively correlated with the active fracking well. This implies that
wells that are farther away from the organic farm will have smaller impact than the wells
that are close to the farm. If the active fracking wells do have an impact on maintaining
organic farm certification, the aggregated indicator may have more of a chance to capture
it.
Figure 4.6 shows that all sixteen selected organic farms have different patterns of sur-
rounding wells. Among these organic farms, farm No.23, No.260, No.519, No.531 were
originally certified, but lost organic certification at the end of the sampling period. For
example, farm No.92 maintains its organic certification in our sampling period. Well num-
ber, production days, weighted distance and indicator remain low level in its sample years
of data. However, farm No.260, which lost its organic certification in its 10th year, has a
significant increasing trend of the surrounding well characteristics within its sample years
of data.
Hence, instead of assuming the impact of fracking is unchangeable over time, it is
worthwhile to treat the exposure to fracking as a time-dependent variable. Ignoring the
time dependency of exposure to fracking when fitting the hazard model might lead to
an incorrect estimate of the hazard function (Munoz-Price et al. 2016). There are two
main types of models which deal with time-dependent variables; one is the Extended Cox
Model, and the other is the Joint Model. The Extended Cox Model is widely used to
handle exogenous time-dependent covariates by treating the occurrence of events as the
realization of a very slow Poisson Process (Fleming and Harrington 2011; Andersen and
Gill 1982). The Joint Model focuses on the survival outcome accounting for the effect
of endogenous time-dependent covariates measured with error. Here, a time-dependent
covariate is endogenous if its value at any time point can be affected by an event occurring
at an earlier time and is exogenous if its value at any point in time is not affected by an
earlier event. In this case, fracking wells in Colorado cluster together around the shale
plays. The existence of a fracking well at earlier time indicates large amounts of oil and gas
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deposits. Therefore, the Joint Model is introduced to deal with the time-dependent impact
of exposure to fracking. Well-level production data was collected to represent the time-
dependent well impact. The Joint Model is adopted from Rizopoulos (2012). The Joint
Model is used to measure the association between the longitudinal impact level and the risk
for an event, while accounting for the endogenous property of the impact indicator. There
are two components of a standard Joint Model, Relative Risk Model and Mixed Effects
Model.
Relative Risk Model:
(4.5) hi[t|Mi(t), playsi] = h0(t) exp(γT playsi + αmi(t))
where mi(t) is the true and unobserved value of active well characteristics; in this paper,
well number, production days, weighted distance and indicator. Mi(t),= mi(s), 0 < s < t, t > 0
is the longitudinal history denoting the history of the true unobserved longitudinal process
up to time point t. α is the parameter of interest, representing the strength of the associa-
tion between the active well characteristics and the risk for an event. playsi is a treatment
indicator, equal to 1 if the organic farm is located on the shale plays, 0 otherwise. h0(t) is
the baseline risk function as defined in the instrumental variable model.
The Linear Mixed Effects Model:
yi(t) = mi(t) + εi(t)(4.6)
= xTi γ + z
T
i (t)bi + εi(t)
= β0 + β1t+ β2t× playsi + bi0 + bi1t+ εi(t)
where xi(t) and β are fixed effects, while zi(t) and bi are random effects. In this model, our
parameter of interest is α, measuring the association between mi(t) (i.e. the four different
well characteristics, well number, production days, weighted distance and indicators) and
the risk for the organic certification loss.
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4.5 Data
The dataset is drawn from several sources. The records of organic farms with the
organic certification effective and suspended or surrendered dates come from USDA Organic
Integrity Database (OID).4 OID maintains the physical addresses of organic farms all around
the world, which provides the opportunity to geocode the location of each organic farm
with longitude and latitude information using google geocoding API service. One of the
important variables in the standard survival analysis is the survival duration. Farm-level
certification duration is calculated starting from the effective date of the certification and
ending with the reported date of suspension or surrender recorded in the OID system.
Table 4.3 lists the shale regions and states. According to the United States Energy
Information Administration, seven regions account for 92% of the country’s shale oil growth
in recent years. Hence, the eight states that house those regions are defined as the shale
states. Location relationship maps between fracking wells and organic farms of selected
states are presented in Figures 4.1-4.3. States with over 100 organic farms at any point
in time up until the end of 2008, namely Pennsylvania, Ohio and Colorado, are depicted.
The location maps of other shale states are presented in Figure C.1 of the Appendix C.
The “active wells” here refers to the wells which are currently producing when surrounding
organic farms are certified. In Colorado, uncertified organic farms and active wells are
clustered together around the shale plays. Compared to a clustered pattern in Colorado,
uncertified organic farms in Ohio are more randomly located within the state boundary. In
Pennsylvania, most of the shale plays are located on the northwest corner, while organic
farms are clustered in the southeast. The clustered pattern of fracking wells and organic
farms leads to the selection of Colorado as the state to explore the effect of fracking on
maintaining organic certification.
Geospatial well data is obtained from various sources. The data sources of each state are
listed on Table 4.3. Active wells are defined as wells located within target buffer zones that
have been drilled within the nearest organic farm survival time period. Four distinct buffer
4The United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, Organic Integrity
Database, website: https://organic.ams.usda.gov/Integrity/Reports/DataHistory.aspx, Accessed:
04/13/2018
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zones are adapted from Auch (2015). They are: core (< 1mile), intermediate (< 3miles),
periphery (< 5miles), and sub-watershed (< 10miles). Figure 4.4 shows the number of
active wells around organic farms in the three selected states. The number of wells with
different bandwidths supports the Figures 4.1 - 4.3. Visually Colorado has the most fracking
wells clustered around the organic farms; therefore, it has the highest number of active wells
around organic farms. Comparing all three panels together, it is evident that only a small
number of active wells fall within the sub-watershed zone in Ohio and Pennsylvania. In
order to capture the impact in the proper size, Colorado is selected as the target state to
study the impact of active fracking well on holding an organic farm certification.
The summary statistics of total active wells for Colorado are listed in Tables 4.4 and
4.5. The average certification duration in years of uncertified organic farms in Colorado is
lower than the state average. This implies that surrounding an organic farm by more active
fracking wells might cause a negative impact to overall organic farming in Colorado.
The well production status data for the Joint Model analysis is obtained from the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission,5 who records the well-level production
data between 1999 and 2018. We combined the production data with well geospatial location
to evaluate the production days and distance of each active well to the nearest organic farm
in Colorado.
The well location is not exogenous because well drilling selection is related to local
economic and regulatory conditions. In order to omit the well location bias, “shale plays” is
treated as an instrumental variable in the empirical framework. The instrumental variable is
obtained from the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA).6 “Shale plays”
tracks the potential of oil and gas production on a shale basin, which is unrelated to any
agricultural decision and is decided before energy development begins. However, it is highly
related to the drilling location of a fracking well.
The main covariate added to the survival model is whether or not an area lies over an
aquifer. The United States aquifer digital map is obtained from the Principal Aquifers of
5https://cogcc.state.co.us/data2.html#/downloads
6https://www.eia.gov/maps/maps.htm
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United States dataset maintained by the United States Geological Survey (USGS).7. The
aquifer layer was modified from the Ground Water Atlas of the United States maps with the
resolution 1 : 2, 500, 000. The aquifer type of each organic farm is collected by overlapping
each organic farm address and the aquifer digital map. There are only two types of aquifers
in Colorado, sandstone aquifers and unconsolidated sand and gravel aquifers.
The number of organic farms in each county for three separate census years, 2002, 2007
and 2012, was collected from the USDA Census of Agriculture. Figure 4.5 illustrates the
organic farm trends from 2002 to 2012. Compared to Ohio and Pennsylvania, Colorado has
the largest decrease in organic farm numbers since 2007.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Kaplan-Meier Plots
Figure 4.7 depicts the probability of survival for a group of organic farms located on
a shale play versus the group of organic farms not located on the shale plays. The group
of organic farms not located on the shale plays has a slightly higher survival rate than the
group of organic farms located on the ”shale plays” after approximately 12 years time. The
stable survival rate for organic farms located on the ”shale plays” is approximately 50%
while the survival rate for organic farms not located on the ”shale plays” is approximately
80%. This result implies that the organic farms located on the shale plays will have a higher
risk of organic certification loss than the farms located farther away from the shale plays
in Colorado. The sudden decline of the red dashed line in the graph in year 22 is driven
by one single organic farm. However, the simple Kaplan-Meier plot is not highly accurate
because it does not count for the endogeneity problem or time-dependent effects.
4.6.2 Survival Curves Without IV Estimation
The survival plots without IV estimation baseline hazard for organic farms in Colorado
7The Principal Aquifers of United States dataset is published in 2003 and contains the shallowest
principal aquifers of the conterminous United States. https://water.usgs.gov/ogw/aquifer/map.html
102
are shown in Figure 4.8, while the estimated cumulative parameters are shown in Figure
4.9. The baseline hazard function is akin to the intercept in a regression model and it must
be positive over time. It describes the risk of losing the organic certification at time t in
the control group. In this case, the control group is organic farms without active fracking
wells in close proximity. There is a significant baseline effect on maintaining an organic
certification in Colorado. Figure 4.8 indicates that even without the fracking wells near an
organic farm, the risk of organic certification loss increases as time goes on. The baseline
hazard rate stays the same when we change the bandwidth from 1 −mile to 10 −miles.
This result is valid because without exposure to fracking wells, organic farms in the control
group should have identical baseline hazard rate with different bandwidth choices. The next
parameter of interest is the estimated cumulative parameter, which is often known as the
Nelson-Aalen estimator of cumulative hazard function. The baseline hazard is estimated
relatively precisely for organic certification, lasting for a shorter time (the 95% confidence
interval is tight around the estimated cumulative hazard) but as the certification duration
increases, the confidence interval gradually widens for the cumulative hazard estimate for
a certification lasting over 15 years. Due to the existence of the baseline hazard for all
organic farms, more organic farms maintain their organic certification for a short time
period and fewer organic farms are able to maintain their certification for more than 15
years in Colorado.
The pattern of cumulative parameters in Figure 4.9 is complex. The cumulative pa-
rameter indicates the risk of treatment farms. For the first 5 years, the slope is negative,
and the upper confidence band lies slightly below zero, except for the plot with the 1−mile
bandwidth choice. This indicates a statistically significant negative early impact of frack-
ing on maintaining organic certification with widened bandwidth choice. The time-varying
coefficient in the Aalen model is zero and constant from 5 to 15 years, indicating no middle
effect. It is nonzero after 15 years within the 1−mile bandwidth choice, indicating a late
effect with short distance, such as 1 mile. Overall, there is no significant effect of fracking
on maintaining organic certification. Except for the time period after approximately 15
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years, an increase in active fracking wells increases the hazard difference between control
and treatment farms very slightly. For example, the hazard ratio is 0.03 at a 1−mile band-
width choice. This indicates that one organic farm with exposure to active fracking wells
within the 1−mile bandwidth will have a 3% greater risk compared to the organic farms
without any fracking exposure. When comparing across the four plots from narrow to wide
bandwidth, it is interesting to see that cumulative coefficients become smaller as bandwidths
increase, indicating that the long-distance exposure might have less risk of maintaining the
organic certification than short-distance exposure. The estimated cumulative coefficients
have large confidence interval after 15 years in four plots because few organic farms still
maintain organic certification after 15 years.
4.6.3 Survival Curves With IV Estimation
Figure 4.10 provides the estimated baseline hazard of active fracking wells within the
10 −mile bandwidth choice in Colorado using IV estimates. It is evident that the overall
trend of the two-stage approach is very close to the survival results without IV. After omit-
ting the heterogeneity of counties by using ”shale plays” as an instrumental variable, the
baseline hazard remains similar with different bandwidth choices. The magnitude of dif-
ferent bandwidth choices slightly decreases from approximately 0.6 to 0.4 after introducing
the IV estimate. However, the estimated cumulative hazard plots below are quite different
from the results without IV.
Figure 4.11 depicts the estimated cumulative parameter with IV for Colorado. The
cumulative coefficient curves hold the same trend as the results without IV, however, the
cumulative hazard with IV shows a larger magnitude of coefficient than the one without IV.
For example, within the 1 −mile bandwidth choice, the cumulative parameter is 0.2 with
IV compared to 0.03 without IV. Instead of having the late effect, the active fracking wells
show no impact on maintaining organic certification within all four bandwidths with IV.
However, the risk of organic certification loss with IV is not statistically significant from zero
from all bandwidth choices within the sampling period. This might be due to the impact
of active fracking wells being a time-dependent variable but the survival analyses with and
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without IV fail to account for this. The results of the Joint Model Analysis accounting for
the time-dependent variable are discussed below.
4.6.4 Joint Model Results
Table 4.6 shows the parameter of interest results for four different bandwidth choices
of four active well characteristics. Again, α represents the strength of the association
between the active well characteristics and the risk for an event. The Joint Model finds a
statistically significant association between four selected active well characteristics and the
risk for organic certification loss. All four selected characteristics, namely well number,
production days, weighted distance and aggregated indicator, are positively correlated
with the risk of losing organic certification. For example, the cell in column 3 row 1 of the
table shows that one unit of decrease in the well number corresponds to a 1 − exp(−α) =
1 − exp(−0.077) = 1 − 92.64% = 7.56% increase in the risk for losing certification. When
comparing “indicator” impact across different bandwidths, the larger the bandwidth, the
smaller the magnitude of impact. However, the significance of the parameter increases as the
bandwidth increases from 1−mile to 10−mile. This implies that exposure to fracking has
both a short-distance impact and a long-distance impact on maintaining organic certification
in Colorado. The short-distance impact has larger magnitude but less significance while the
long-distance impact has smaller magnitude but more significance.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper explores the effect of energy development on organic farming by evaluat-
ing the length of maintaining organic certification near fracking wells in Colorado. The
different distribution relationships between active fracking wells and organic farms in eight
different shale states are illustrated. Relatively more active fracking wells are located near
organic farms in Colorado than other shale states. A survival model with IV estimates is
used to explore the short-distance and long-distance exposure impacts of fracking on or-
ganic certification. The results suggest that exposure to fracking has a small but negative
impact on maintaining organic certification in both short-distance and long-distance band-
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width choices. The impact of exposure to fracking is treated as a time-dependent variable.
Findings suggest that both short-distance and long-distance impact of fracking exist, but
the overall impact of active fracking wells on organic farming is not evident especially for a
long-distance bandwidth choice.
Drilling activities appear to discourage organic farming in Colorado. Identifying the
direct causes of organic certification loss can support policy development that regulates
negative externalities on organic farms caused by drilling. While farmers with mineral own-
ership directly benefit from mineral rights leasing and royalty payments (Weber, Brown,
and Pender 2013), most organic farmers without mineral ownership will be damaged as a re-
sult of hydraulic fracturing. High organic premiums encourage organic farmers to maintain
the organic certification, but the cost of maintaining the certification itself would increase
due to the threat of the nearby drilling pads. Intensive fracking activities can be a strong
deterrent to many conventional farmers considering a conversion to organic farming. For
those conventional farmers who are willing to convert to organic production, a higher op-
portunity cost may be present with the close proximity to drilling pads. For example, the
waiting period of three years might extended during the initial transition period for farms
near fracking wells. Federally subsidized crop insurance could be one of the solutions to
lowering the opportunity cost during the initial transition of those farmers without mineral
ownership.
Due to the restriction of dataset size, confidence intervals are quite wide in this paper.
As the fracking boom only started around 2004, the fracking impact time is still relatively
short. This problem might be solved in the future by collecting longer time period data
and adding more observations into the dataset.
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Table 4.1. Correlations and IV
strengthen/significance
State d1 d3 d5 d10
Colorado 0.195 0.217 0.237 0.299
Table 4.2. Summary of first stage model
Active Well Number
1-mile 3-mile 5-mile 10-mile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
play 2.536*** 25.232*** 70.466*** 313.419***
-0.558 -4.962 -12.876 -47.705
aquifer -0.001 -0.005 -0.01 0.035
-0.001 -0.007 -0.018 -0.065
Constant 0.197 1.912 4.185 -6.275
-0.452 -4.021 -10.435 -38.662
Observations 545 545 545 545
R2 0.039 0.048 0.057 0.09
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.045 0.053 0.087
Residual Std. Error (df = 542) 6.041 53.708 139.367 516.354
F Statistic (df = 2; 542) 10.951*** 13.722*** 16.261*** 26.764***
Note: ∗p < 0.1;∗∗ p < 0.05;∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.4. Summary statistics of active wells
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Within 1 miles 545 1 6 0 54
Within 3 miles 545 12 55 0 467
Within 5 miles 545 36 143 0 1,121
Within 10 miles 545 171 540 0 4,517
Duration 545 6 5 1 22
Note: This table depict the summary statistics of active fracking wells
around all the organic farms in Colorado with four different bandwidth
choices.
Table 4.5. Summary statistics of active wells around uncertified farms
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Within 1 miles 139 4 11 0 54
Within 3 miles 139 34 91 0 467
Within 5 miles 139 91 237 0 1,120
Within 10 miles 139 349 873 0 4,517
Duration 139 4 4 1 22
Note: This table depict the summary statistics of active fracking wells around all
the organic farms and uncertified organic farms in Colorado with four different
bandwidth choices. There are 139 uncertified organic farms losing their organic
certification until year 2018. Comparing the mean of surrounding active fracking
well number, the data shows that more active wells are around the uncertified
organic farms.
109
T
a
b
le
4
.6
.
P
a
ra
m
e
te
r
o
f
in
te
re
st
,
α
1-
m
il
e
ex
p
(-
α
)
3-
m
il
e
ex
p
(-
α
)
5-
m
il
e
ex
p
(-
α
)
1
0
-m
il
e
ex
p
(-
α
)
W
el
l
N
u
m
b
er
s
0.
07
7
92
.6
4%
**
0.
00
7
99
.3
2%
**
0.
00
2
99
.7
6%
**
0
.0
0
1
9
9
.9
3
%
*
*
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
D
ay
s
0.
00
7
99
.3
5%
**
*
0.
00
1
99
.9
2%
**
*
0.
00
0
99
.9
7%
**
*
0
.0
0
0
9
9
.9
9
%
*
*
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
W
ei
gh
te
d
D
is
ta
n
ce
0.
07
3
93
.0
1%
**
0.
01
2
98
.8
4%
**
0.
00
7
99
.3
5%
**
0
.0
0
3
9
9
.6
7
%
*
*
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
In
d
ic
at
or
0.
00
4
99
.6
5%
**
0.
00
2
99
.8
4%
**
*
0.
00
1
99
.9
2%
**
*
0
.0
0
0
9
9
.9
6
%
*
*
*
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
110
Figure 4.1. Location map of Colorado
Note: The dark red and bright red dots represent uncertified organic farms. Purple line
represents the shale plays. Grey dots represent all the active wells in Colorado.
Figure 4.2. Location map of Ohio
Note: The dark red and bright red dots represent uncertified organic farms. Purple line
represents the shale plays. Grey dots represent all the active wells in Ohio.
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Figure 4.3. Location map of Pennsylvania
Note: The dark red and bright red dots represent uncertified organic farms. Purple line
represents the shale plays. Grey dots represent all the active wells in Pennsylvania.
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Figure 4.4. Fracking wells around organic farms in the target states
Note: The solid line represents total active wells around both certified and uncertified
organic farms. The dashed line represents all the active wells around only uncertified organic
farms. Red represents Colorado, green represents Ohio, and blue represents Pennsylvania.
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Figure 4.5. Number of organic farms in Colorado, Ohio and Pennsylvania
Note: Red represent Colorado, green represents Ohio and blue represents Pennsylvania.
Grey shade represents the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 4.6. Selected active well characteristics visualization
Note: Top left panel shows how well number changes over time for sixteen different organic
farms. Top right panel shows the production day visualization. The Bottom left shows
the weighted distance visualization and the bottom right shows the indicator visualization.
Among the sixteen farms, the farm No.23, No.260, No.519, No.531 lose their certification
in their lifetime.
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Figure 4.7. Kaplan-Meier estimates of the probability of survival for
the control group (Not on Shale Plays) and treatment
groups (On shale Plays)
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Figure 4.8. Estimated cumulative baseline hazard
Note: The top left panel shows the estimated cumulative baseline hazard of all the organic
farms accounting for all the active wells within 1-mile radius. The top right represents
the cumulative baseline hazard of 3-mile. The bottom left plot represents the cumulative
baseline hazard of 5-mile and the bottom right represents the plot of 10-mile. The time du-
ration is counted in years. The results are displayed together with 95% confidence intervals
in dashed line.
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Figure 4.9. Estimated cumulative parameters
Note: The four figures from the top left panel to bottom right panel show the estimated
cumulative parameters with 1-mile, 3-mile, 5-mile and 10-mile bandwidth choice. The
time duration is counted in years. The results are displayed together with 95% confidence
intervals in dashed line.
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Figure 4.10. Estimated cumulative baseline hazard (two-stage approach)
Note: The top left panel shows the estimated cumulative baseline hazard of all the organic
farms accounting for all the active wells within 1-mile radius. The top right represents
the cumulative baseline hazard of 3-mile. The bottom left plot represents the cumulative
baseline hazard of 5-mile and the bottom right represents the plot of 10-mile. The time du-
ration is counted in years. The results are displayed together with 95% confidence intervals
in dashed line.
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Figure 4.11. Estimated cumulative parameters (two-stage approach)
Note: The four figures from the top left panel to bottom right panel show the estimated
cumulative parameters with 1-mile, 3-mile, 5-mile and 10-mile bandwidth choice. The
time duration is counted in years. The results are displayed together with 95% confidence
intervals in dashed line.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the externalities caused by
incomplete ownership of natural resources, such as land, water, oil and gas, and provides
three applications of novel econometric techniques to help explain the causal relationships
between incomplete ownership and changes in regional development.
The first essay analyzes the relationship between insecure land ownership and lag of
agricultural development on American Indian land. Our findings include that tribal lands
have lower irrigation rates and significantly less investment in capital-intensive irrigation
systems, such as sprinkler irrigation systems. The tribal land is also less likely to be used in
high-value crop production compared to their non-tribal neighbors. These results suggest
that tribal trust land ownership creates difficulties for tribal farmers in acquiring capital
for agricultural investment. A key solution to improving agricultural development on tribal
trust land appears to be improving tribal farmers’ access to capital, allowing tribal farmers
to invest in irrigation systems at the level of their fee-simple neighbors.
The central contribution of this paper is a causal estimate of the effect of tribal own-
ership on irrigation using a spatial RD approach and a new micro-level dataset linking
agricultural irrigation choice, land ownership data, and historic land allocation. Previous
studies have linked the limited tribal agricultural development to weak institutions, but, be-
cause of data limitation, none of the studies answer this research question using the spatial
RD approach with a micro-level dataset. In this study, both sharp and fuzzy RD approaches
were used to test the hypothesis, with the results of the two approaches complementing each
other. The usage of Public Land Survey System to construct the unit of observation in the
data construction procedure can be widely applied to construct micro-level land ownership
datasets in the future.
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The second essay presents a general equilibrium representation of a hydrologic-ecological-
economic system together with synthetic control methodology to explore the impact of the
Qualification Settlement Agreement between agricultural and urban regions in California.
First, a water trading model between two small open economies is constructed. There
are three separate sectors in each economy: agricultural sector, manufacturing sector, and
ecosystem sector. One of the economies is rural, with the agricultural sector as the domain
sector and the biggest share of labor. The rural economy exports water to urban economy.
The theoretical model predicts that after exporting a large amount of water, the return to
water in the water exporting region will increase, while the return to skilled and unskilled
labor in the water exporting region will decrease. A synthetic control methodology is used
in the empirical framework. Counties within California are divided into two groups, a treat-
ment group with only the water exporting county and control group encompassing all other
counties. Imperial County was selected as the treatment county in this study. Consistent
with the theoretical model, the empirical analysis found similar results: the water transfer
agreement in California caused a decline of both skilled and unskilled agricultural labor in
Imperial County. The increased water value of the post-trade period can be seen through
increased crop yields, but this result is not statistically significant. Adding more pre-trade
sample years or extending the research region to the entire western United States may
increase the significance of crop yields in the future.
The voluntary fallowing program increasingly conserves water from the agricultural
sector. The conserved water is exported to San Diego County and the increased volume
of water trading reduces water availability in Imperial County. One of the goals of QSA
is to restore the Salton Sea ecosystem with the mitigation water saved from the voluntary
fallowing program, however, the reduced water availability may cause Salton Sea to decline
further. The water inflow decreases because of the limited water availability. The salinity
problem of Salton Sea will become worse as a result of reduced inflow, as there is no outlet
for Salton Sea and water is lost only through evaporation.
These results of this paper imply that more job opportunities should be created in
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the water exporting region, such as Imperial County, to mitigate the rapid decrease of
both the skilled and unskilled labor force. Due to the voluntary fallowing program, on-
farm agricultural labor will face a significant drop in fallowing months. Instead of letting
unemployed agricultural labor seek employment opportunities out of Imperial County, more
job opportunities in other sectors within Imperial County should be created. Another
alternative policy could focus on targeting low agricultural and environmental productivity
water for transfers to minimize the aforementioned impacts while still creating gains from
trade.
To our knowledge, this is the first research study that links an analytic general equilib-
rium analysis with causal empirical results in studying the performance of water transfers.
This work suggests that managing water trading program more effectively could increase
their adoption, potentially by determining policies to support the local labor market.
The third essay explores the impact of shale development on organic farming. This
study provides empirical evidence of the potential impacts of hydraulic fracturing on the
length of time in maintaining organic farming certification in Colorado. Two economet-
ric models, survival analysis with an instrumental variable and a joint model with time-
dependent variables, are used. The central contribution of this essay is that it is among the
first research studies to use a farm-level geospatial dataset to explore the impact of hydraulic
fracturing on farming, and, to my knowledge, the first to examine organic farming.
The paper starts with a discussion about distribution relationships between fracking
wells and organic farms. Among all shale states, Colorado has the most exposure to fracking
wells, as almost all fracking wells are clustered near organic farms. Hence, Colorado is
selected as the target state in this paper. The empirical framework can be divided into
three sections starting with a simple Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival curve of the
time until an organic farm fails to be certified. Kaplan-Meier estimators imply that the
organic farms on the shale plays have a higher risk of organic certification loss than the
farms not on the shale plays. In the second section of empirical framework, an instrumental
variable estimation in a survival analysis context is used to solve the endogeneity problem
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due to a lack of correspondence between oil and gas deposits and suitable agricultural land.
A statistically insignificant negative impact of maintaining organic certification in both a
short-distance and a long-distance bandwidth choice is observed for all four bandwidth
choices. The impact of exposure to fracking is then treated as a time-dependent variable.
Findings suggest that both statistically significant short-distance and long-distance impacts
of fracking exist, but the overall impact of active fracking wells on organic farming is not
evident, especially for a long-distance bandwidth choice.
This paper suggests that hydraulic fracturing appears to discourage organic farming
in Colorado. The impact is quite small, however, due to the short impact time as the
fracking boom only started around 2004. Direct benefits from mineral rights leasing and
royalty payments would increase farmers’ wealth, but these benefits are only limited to the
organic farmers with the mineral ownership. The opportunity costs of maintaining organic
certification would increase due to the surrounding drilling pads. The intensive fracking
activities would discourage many conventional farmers from converting to organic farms.
The average waiting time during the transition period would be extended, due to drilling
activities around organic farms. Federally subsidized crop insurance could be one of the
solutions to lowering the opportunity cost during the initial transition for those farmers
without mineral ownership.
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APPENDIX A
Chapter 2 Appendix
Table A.1. Crops value classification
Crops Crop Value Crop Value Indicator
Alfalfa Low 0
Beans High 1
Berries High 1
Corn High 1
Dry Alfalfa Low 0
Dry Beans High 1
Dry Grain High 1
Dry Grain/Seeds High 1
Dry Oats High 1
Dry Safflower High 1
Fallow-Irrigated Ag Low 0
Fallow-Irrigated Land Low 0
Grain High 1
Grass Hay Low 0
Grass Hay-sub-irrigated Low 0
Idle-Irrigated Ag Low 0
Idle-Irrigated Land Low 0
Idle-Irrigated Pasture Low 0
Melon/Pumpkin/Squash High 1
Oats High 1
Onions High 1
Orchard High 1
Other Horticulture High 1
Other Vegetables High 1
Pasture Low 0
Pasture-sub-irrigated Low 0
Potatoes High 1
Safflower High 1
Sorghum High 1
Tomatoes High 1
Turf Farms High 1
Vineyard High 1
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Figure A.1. RD plots of soil quality with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order
polynomial using 1905 Allotment Boundary
Figure A.2. RD plots of agricultural rate with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order
polynomial using 1905 Allotment Boundary using WRL dataset
146
Figure A.3. RD plots of irrigation rate with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order
polynomial using 1905 Allotment Boundary
Figure A.4. RD plots of sprinkler-irrigated rate with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
order polynomial using 1905 Allotment Bundary
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Figure A.5. RD plots of high-value crops rate with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
order polynomial using 1905 Allotment Boundary using WRL
dataset
Figure A.6. RD plots of soil quality with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order
polynomial using 2017 Tribal Boundary
148
Figure A.7. RD plots of agricultural rate with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order
polynomial using 2017 Tribal Boundary using WRL dataset
Figure A.8. RD plots of irrigation rate with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order
polynomial using 2017 Tribal Boundary
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Figure A.9. RD plots of sprinkler-irrigated rate with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
order polynomial using 2017 Tribal Boundary
Figure A.10. RD plots of high-value crops rate with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
order polynomial using 2017 Tribal Boundary using WRL
dataset
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APPENDIX B
Chapter 3 Appendix
Figure B.1. Quarterly labor statistics (before imputation)
Note: Top panel represents the quarterly earnings and the bottom panel represents
quarterly employment. The vertical line represents the QSA effected quarter, the
fourth quarter of 2003.
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Figure B.2. Quarterly labor statistics (after imputation)
Note: Top panel represents the quarterly earnings and the bottom panel represents quarterly
employment. The vertical line represents the QSA effected quarter, the fourth quarter of
2003. We notice an unusual spike of both earnings and employment in 2002 but it goes
back to usual in the following year. This indicates a data issue of the 2002 labor data. We
use the quarterly data of 2001 and 2003 to impute the labor data of 2002.
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Figure B.3. Placebo test plots in crop production statistics
Note: The crop value is in millions of dollars. The vertical line represents the QSA effective
year, 2004.
153
Figure B.4. Restricted sample size placebo test plots crop production
statistics (20 times)
Note: The county with pre-QSA MSPE greater than 20 times Imperial County pre-QSA
MSPE are excluded from the sample. The crop value is in millions of dollars. The vertical
line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
154
Figure B.5. Restricted sample size placebo test plots in crop production
statistics (10 times)
Note:The county with pre-QSA MSPE greater than 10 times Imperial County pre-QSA
MSPE are excluded from the sample. The crop value is in millions of dollars. The vertical
line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
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Figure B.6. Restricted sample size placebo test plots in crop production
statistics (5 times)
Note: The county with pre-QSA MSPE greater than 5 times Imperial County pre-QSA
MSPE are excluded from the sample. The crop value is in millions of dollars. The vertical
line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
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Figure B.7. Placebo test plots in labor statistics in crop production
sector
Note: All the employment and earnings data are calculated by the quarterly aver-
age. Earnings is in dollars and Employment is in the number of jobs. The vertical
line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
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Figure B.8. Restricted sample size placebo test plots in labor statistics
in crop production sector(20 times)
Note: The county with pre-QSA MSPE greater than 20 times Imperial County pre-
QSA MSPE are excluded from the sample. All the employment and earnings data
are calculated by the quarterly average. Earnings is in dollars and Employment is
in the number of jobs. The vertical line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
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Figure B.9. Restricted sample size placebo test plots in labor statistics
in crop production sector (10 times)
Note: The county with pre-QSA MSPE greater than 10 times Imperial County pre-
QSA MSPE are excluded from the sample. All the employment and earnings data
are calculated by the quarterly average. Earnings is in dollars and Employment is
in the number of jobs. The vertical line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
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Figure B.10. Restricted sample size placebo test plots in labor
statistics in crop production sector (5 times)
Note: The county with pre-QSA MSPE greater than 5 times Imperial County pre-
QSA MSPE are excluded from the sample. All the employment and earnings data
are calculated by the quarterly average. Earnings is in dollars and Employment is
in the number of jobs. The vertical line represents the QSA effective year, 2004.
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APPENDIX C
Chapter 4 Appendix
Table C.1. Likelihood ratio test
Df Sum of Sq RSS AIC Pr(>Chi)
1-mile 1.98E+04 1,963.37
play 1 753.64 2.05E+04 1,981.75 6.34E-06 ***
aquifer 1 15.93 1.98E+04 1,961.81 0.51
3-mile 1.56E+06 4,345.06
play 1 7.46E+04 1.64E+06 4,368.46 4.66E-07 ***
aquifer 1 1,542.57 1.56E+06 4,343.60 0.46
5-mile 1.05E+07 5,384.44
play 1 5.82E+05 1.11E+07 5,411.75 6.16E-08 ***
aquifer 1 6,016.74 1.05E+07 5,382.75 0.58
10-mile 1.45E+08 6,812.00
play 1 1.15E+07 1.56E+08 6,851.76 1.03E-10 ***
aquifer 1 7.56E+04 1.45E+08 6,810.28 0.59
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